Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence by Ahrens, Deborah
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 37 | Issue 4 Article 2
2010
Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence
Deborah Ahrens
abc@123.com
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Deborah Ahrens, Methademic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. (2010) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol37/iss4/2
FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
METHDEMIC: DRUG PANIC IN AN AGE OF AMBIVALENCE 
 
Deborah Ahrens
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VOLUME 37 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMER 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUMBER 4
 
Recommended citation: Deborah Ahrens, Methdemic: Drug Panic in an Age of Ambivalence, 
37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 841 (2010).  
METHADEMIC: DRUG PANIC IN AN AGE OF 
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DEBORAH AHRENS*
ABSTRACT
 The story of criminal sanctions in modern America is a familiar—and depressing—
narrative. According to the narrative, we live in an era where the dynamics of popular poli-
tics, the practices of the media, and the (often racialized) anxieties of modern life combine to 
create a one-way ratchet, in which we identify perceived new threats to public order and re-
spond unthinkingly with harsh new criminal sanctions. On the surface, the wave of concern 
over methamphetamine that swept the nation in the middle part of this decade followed this 
script, as a media panic led to substantial popular concern and significant new legislation. 
When one digs a little deeper, however, the story is more complicated: Instead of a singular 
focus on increased criminal penalties and mass incarceration, we see a multifaceted strategy 
focused on educating the public, limiting access to ingredients, and remediating environ-
mental concerns raised by the manufacture of the drug. 
 Why has public and legislative concern about a drug described in terms of natural dis-
asters and communicable deadly diseases generated cold medication restrictions and educa-
tional programs rather than extensive new criminal law? This Article—the first comprehen-
sive examination of our legal and cultural response to methamphetamine—asks and at-
tempts to answer that question. After providing a succinct history of modern American drug 
policy, the Article narrates the wave of coverage that sparked concern about a possible “Me-
thademic” and then catalogs state and local responses to the alleged threat. It concludes by 
offering some informed speculation about the possible reasons for this surprisingly tepid re-
sponse. After considering and rejecting or partially crediting a number of explanations—
most notably that the popular identification of methamphetamine as a “white drug” muted 
the expected hostility to its users—the Article concludes that the public response to metham-
phetamine was, in fact, the first chapter in a new era of drug policy: the age of ambivalence. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 The mainstream scholarly read of criminal law and sentencing in 
the United States is that the nation has in modern times moved only 
in one direction, towards increased criminalization of behavior and 
lengthier sentences for crimes.1 This expansion of law and creation of 
prison cells occurs regardless of whether crime is increasing and 
whether empirical studies support its need—either the public de-
mands that the criminal law extend to cover additional conduct and 
legislators are only too happy to oblige, or legislators perceive politi-
cal gains to be possible if they persuade the public that a given be-
havior is particularly socially dangerous and merits criminalization 
or increased punishment. In particular, in the area of illicit drugs, 
legislators have expanded codes and increased penalties over the 
course of the twentieth century—most strikingly, since the mid-
1970s—in ways that have dramatically increased our prison popula-
tion. At this point, the United States imprisons both the largest 
number of people and the highest percentage of its citizenry of any 
                                                                                                                               
 1. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as a “one-way ratchet”: for political 
reasons, legislatures can only move in the direction of criminalization and imprisonment. 
See, e.g., Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Rita, District Court Discretion, and Fairness in 
Federal Sentencing, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 51, 54 (2007) (describing the United States Sen-
tencing Guidelines Commission’s process of creating guidelines as a “one-way ratchet” in-
creasing sentences); Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World 
of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 301 (2005) (describing Congressional ad-
justments to federal sentencing rules as a “one-way ratchet”); Erik Luna, The Overcrimina-
lization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719 (2005) (positing that the criminal code ex-
pands because politicians have a political incentive to criminalize but not to decriminalize); 
Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1293, 1349 (2006) (describing majority rule as a “one-way ratchet” that expands the penal 
state); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 507 (2001) (arguing that “all change in criminal law seems to push in the same direc-
tion—toward more liability”); Ian Weinstein, The Revenge of Mullaney v. Wilbur: United 
States v. Booker and the Reassertion of Judicial Limits on Legislative Power to Define 
Crimes, 84 OR. L. REV. 393, 399 (2005) (describing a “one-way ratchet” in which legislation 
“only begets more penal law and imposes even harsher sentences”). But see Darryl K. 
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 225 (2007) (arguing that 
“[t]he ratchet of crime legislation turns both ways” and describing ongoing legislative ef-
forts to decriminalize behavior). 
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nation in the world.2 Scholars and lay commentators, seeking to ex-
plain the striking incarceration increase in modern America, often 
point to the widespread criminalization of drug use and, in particu-
lar, to the increased attention to and enforcement of antidrug laws as 
part of the “War on Drugs.”3
 After the rash of media articles about methamphetamine in 2005 
and 2006,4 an observant student of American criminal sanctions 
might have expected to find, ensconced in new methamphetamine-
related legislation, exponentially increased penalties, new mandatory 
minimum sentences, life imprisonment for multiple offenses—the 
sorts of changes in the law that occurred in response to a perceived 
epidemic of crack cocaine during the late 1980s and early 1990s.5 The 
one-way ratchet of criminal sanctions would have turned in the direc-
tion of code expansion and punishment increase, and sellers, produc-
ers, and users of methamphetamine would have expected to find 
themselves incarcerated. 
 Those sorts of changes, however, have not broadly characterized 
new methamphetamine legislation. Rather, the bulk of changes have 
either restricted the ability of potential methamphetamine manufac-
turers to access the materials used to generate methamphetamine or 
sought to contain the effects of methamphetamine use and produc-
tion on innocent bystanders who might be exposed to environmental 
toxins and laboratory explosions.6 Certainly, some themes that we 
have seen with past waves of drug legislation and litigation have 
been repeated—in particular, the insulation of children from the ef-
fects of drug use and the expansion of Fourth Amendment exceptions 
                                                                                                                               
 2. The United States has increased its incarcerated population fivefold since the ear-
ly 1970s. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, by the middle of 2007, 1,595,034 
persons were incarcerated in state and federal prisons, and an additional 766,010 persons 
were either serving sentences in local jails or held in jail pretrial. See WILLIAM J. SABOL &
HEATHER COUTURE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISON INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2007, (Jun. 2008) 
1, 6, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=840; see also PEW CTR.
ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 3, 5 (2008), available at
http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/8015PCTS_Prison08_FINAL_2-1-
1_FORWEB.pdf (finding that one in 100 adult Americans currently are incarcerated in jail or 
prison, and providing breakdowns of incarceration rates by race and gender). In addition, a 
substantial number of Americans, while not incarcerated, are under probation and parole su-
pervision. See generally PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF AMERICAN 
CORRECTIONS (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/ 
One%20in%20100.pdf.
 3. See, e.g., MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 4 (1995) (discussing the degree to which the “War on Drugs” is responsible for the 
mass incarceration of African Americans); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of 
Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 381, 393 (2002) (arguing that “[t]he mass incarceration of African Americans is a 
direct consequence of the War on Drugs” and offering data to demonstrate more generally 
the connection between drug policy and increased incarceration rates). 
 4. See infra Part III.A.  
 5. See infra Part II.B.  
 6. See infra Part III.B.   
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to accommodate law enforcement needs.7 Methamphetamine users, 
producers, and traffickers have been prosecuted and incarcerated,8
while some states have increased the penalties for methampheta-
mine offenses.9 However, in general, the law’s response to the me-
thamphetamine pandemic has been more tempered than recent his-
tory might project.10
 What explains the difference in legislative response? Perhaps 
some of it has to do with race. According to some scholarship on drug 
control in the United States, drug prohibition tends to dovetail with 
cultural attitudes towards particular groups (generally defined by 
race, ethnicity, class, or national origin), and anxiety about particular 
subgroups manifests itself through draconian new criminal sanc-
                                                                                                                               
 7. See infra Part IV. 
 8. See, e.g., BUREAU JUST. STAT., FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2005, BUREAU JUS 
STATISTICS BULLETIN 2 (September 2008), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ 
index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=1104 (noting that twenty-two percent of Drug Enforcement 
Agency arrests in 2005 were for methamphetamine offenses). 
 9. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 845, §§2-3, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1922, 1923 (co-
dified at Tenn. Code. Ann. §39-17-417 (Supp. 2005)) (lowering the triggering quantity of 
methamphetamine for certain sentences from 100 and 1000 grams to 26 and 300 grams). 
 10. For recent works that note this surprising trend, see DORIS MARIE PROVINE, UNEQUAL 
UNDER LAW: RACE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS 165-66 (2007) (citing evidence about methampheta-
mine policy and concluding that, when it comes to drug policy, there seem to be “signs that 
something may have been learned from past experience”); Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack 
Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World, 42 AKRON L. REV. 105, 133-34 (2009) (“Perhaps 
a better indicator of Congress’ willingness to change is its handling of the dramatic rise of me-
thamphetamine, which some have termed the ‘new crack.’ In 2006, Congress enacted the first 
comprehensive methamphetamine law, which, surprisingly, focuses less on tougher penalties 
and more on cutting off access to the ingredients used to manufacture the drug.”); see also Mau-
reen P. Smith, Comment, America’s Methamphetamine Crisis: Solving One of America’s Leading 
Drug Problems Through Child Abuse and Nuisance Laws, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 612 (2008) 
(advocating the use of nuisance and, to a lesser extent, child abuse laws as primary tools for 
fighting methamphetamine despite offering a hyperbolic account of current problems caused by 
the drug). 
 The academic literature on our cultural and legal response to methamphetamine is still in 
its infancy. The leading sociologists and criminologists who study drug policy have thus far been 
surprisingly silent about methamphetamine. A few law journals have published scattered piec-
es—often student works—cataloging and critiquing some meth-related legislations. See, e.g.,
Maureen P. Smith, Note, Cooking Up Solutions to a Cooked Up Menace: Responses to Metham-
phetamine in a Federal System, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2508 (2006); see also Elizabeth E. Joh, Im-
agining the Addict: Evaluating Social and Legal Responses to Addiction, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 175 
(comparing media coverage of and legal response to methamphetamine addiction with the very 
different response to tobacco addiction). The Sentencing Project, an academically-inclined advo-
cacy organization, has published one significant study:  RYAN S. KING, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, THE NEXT BIG THING? METHAMPHETAMINE IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/dp_nextbigthing_meth.pdf. Popular commen-
tators have shown a bit more interest. See, e.g., DIRK JOHNSON, METH: THE HOME-COOKED 
MENACE: HOW A LETHAL DRUG IS DEVASTATING OUR COMMUNITIES AND WHAT’S BEING DONE 
ABOUT IT (2005) (offering a hyperbolic account of meth use and its consequences); NICK REDING,
METHLAND: THE DEATH AND LIFE OF AN AMERICAN SMALL TOWN (2009)  (offering a more 
nuanced portrait of meth use and its consequences, one that largely portrays meth use as an ef-
fect—rather than a cause—of the decline of rural America). 
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tions.11 A common interpretation of the harsh response to crack co-
caine, for example, is that the perceived epidemic coincided with an-
xiety about urban crime and racially-tinged animosity against what 
were perceived as mostly African-American users and sellers; the re-
sulting expansive sanctions reflected racism against African Ameri-
cans.12 Perhaps the comparatively sanguine reaction to methamphe-
tamine results from the fact that the majority of users are white.13
 Relatedly, perhaps the fact that the majority of methamphetamine 
users are white has changed the incentives for press, police, and poli-
ticians. If past drug hysteria was fueled by racialized bias and anxie-
ty, and the press, public, and law enforcement officials have—due to 
the race of most methamphetamine users—tempered their responses 
and couched descriptions of the perceived methamphetamine epidem-
ic in less florid language than they have used in the past, they may 
have produced a climate in which there is simply less demand for a 
draconian legal response.14 Alternatively, the pressure for legislative 
change might flow from legislators and executives themselves: repre-
sentatives and administrators might cynically perceive that they can 
increase personal or institutional power by persuading the public 
that there exists a serious problem with a particular substance or a 
group that might be linked to that substance. Perhaps officials be-
lieve that they have less to gain with harsh rhetoric and legislation 
where a drug-linked group is Caucasian. 
 These theories go some distance, perhaps, in explaining the differ-
ence between past legislative responses to drug use and the current 
response to the use, sale, and manufacture of methamphetamine, but 
they are insufficient to provide a full account. To the contrary, there 
is increasing evidence that something bigger is going on: careful and 
contextual examination of our cultural and legislative response to 
methamphetamine suggests that public attitudes towards drug regu-
lation more generally seem to be changing. There is increasing evi-
dence that the current legislative climate seems generally hostile to 
ratcheting up criminal sanctions for drug crimes and that the public 
appetite for harsh sanctions has begun to wane.15 The “one-way rat-
                                                                                                                               
 11. See, e.g., JAMES B. BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE 
SOCIETY 69 (1998) (“Attitudes toward minorities, work, worldly success and failure, or sex 
and family life sometimes turn out to be the real issues in a controversy about drugs. 
Drugs are symbols charged with cultural tensions.”). 
 12. For discussion of the role that race played in fueling the legislative and cultural 
response to crack cocaine, see infra Part II.B and the works cited therein. 
 13. For data on the racial composition of those using or selling methamphetamine, see 
infra notes 115-16 & 210 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part V.A.2.  
 15. For a discussion of this trend in the context of methamphetamine, see infra Part III. 
For some recent high-profile incidents in which the trend has played out more broadly, see, 
for example, Theo Emery, Will Crack Cocaine Sentencing Reform Help Current Cons?, TIME ,
Aug 7, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1915131,00.html 
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chet” as applied to drug offenses is beginning, in some high-profile 
instances, to spin in the opposite direction. 
 In Part II of this Article, I offer a brief overview of drug policy in the 
United States, focusing on the link between sanctions for drug offenses 
and the subgroups against which those sanctions have been targeted. 
In particular, I focus on the literature surrounding the crack cocaine 
pandemic of the late 1980s and the legislative response to concern ex-
pressed by the public and by the media. In Part III, I provide a synop-
sis of state and federal legislative responses to methamphetamine. In 
Part IV, I analyze ways in which these responses resemble and depart 
from past responses to perceived epidemics of drug use. Finally, in 
Part V, I provide explanations for why these responses are more tem-
pered than what history might have predicted.   
 President Barack Obama’s administration recently, and with little 
fanfare, declared that the “War on Drugs” has come to a close.16
While that announcement—and the policy shifts it represents—do 
not signal that we have entered an era of drug legalization, they do 
suggest that we have entered a new era in drug policy. As it turns 
out, the American appetite for criminalization and incarceration is 
not insatiable.   
II.   A (RELATIVELY) BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN DRUG POLICY
 The application of criminal sanctions to the use, sale, and manu-
facture of various drugs is a relatively modern phenomenon. Until 
the twentieth century, American criminal law did not encompass 
what we would now think of as illicit drugs; substances such as 
opium and cocaine were in fact commonly available in products man-
ufactured legally and designed for mass consumption.17 In Subpart A, 
                                                                                                                               
(quoting President Obama, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of criminal law issues, 
and the Chair of Federal Sentencing Commission on the need to eliminate the infamous 
crack-powder cocaine sentencing disparity, citing legislative progress on such reform, and 
predicting that “this may be the year” that the disparity is eliminated); Gary Fields, White 
House Czar Calls for End to “War on Drugs,” WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, at A3 (quoting new 
federal Drug Czar Gil Kerlikowske’s repudiation of the language, and some of the policies, of 
the so-called “War on Drugs”); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (allow-
ing judges discretion to sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser terms 
based on judges’ personal disapproval of crack/powder disparity). 
 16. See Fields, supra note 15.   
 17. See LESTER GRINSPOON & JAMES B. BAKALAR, COCAINE: A DRUG AND ITS SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 28 (1976) (noting that cocaine-containing Coca-Cola was essential in putting 
drugstore soda fountains at the center of 1890s culture); LESTER GRINSPOON & PETER 
HEDBLOM, THE SPEED CULTURE: AMPHETAMINE USE AND ABUSE IN AMERICA 185-86 (1975) 
(listing over-the-counter medications available at the end of the nineteenth century, such 
as the morphine-laced Dr. Grove’s Anodyne for Infants and Dr. Moffett’s Teething Com-
pound); Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Punitive Prohibition in America, in CRACK IN 
AMERICA: DEMON DRUGS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 323 (Craig Reinaman & Harry G. Levine, 
eds., 1997) (noting that Coca-Cola, advertised as a temperate “soft drink” alternative to al-
cohol, contained cocaine, and groceries vended opium-based medications). 
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I offer a short history of legislative decisions to criminalize and in-
crease penalties attendant to trade and possession of various sub-
stances, viewed through the lens of the most common explanation for 
the growth of such policies, which sees them as an attempt to mark 
and constrain racial and other minorities who threaten the peace or 
self-image of traditional majorities. In Subpart B, I focus on the lite-
rature surrounding legislative responses to crack cocaine, the most 
high-profile and thoroughly-dissected recent chapter in American 
drug policy.   
A.   The Twentieth Century and Drug Policy Development 
 What we now think of as illicit drugs were once widely available 
in the United States and untouched by criminal law.18 The various 
legislative developments attaching criminal sanctions to illicit drugs 
are creatures of the twentieth century, and those developments have 
corresponded, per many academic commentators, with periods of con-
cern about population groups associated with those substances.19 Ac-
cording to perhaps the most common critical narrative of United 
States drug policy, changes in the criminal law as applied to illicit 
drugs come not at times of actual increases in drug use or drug-
related social problems; rather, at times of anxiety about particular 
disfavored social groups, the panicking public develops drug laws to 
regulate and punish the use and sale of drugs stereotypically asso-
ciated with the disfavored group.20 While the substances described  
                                                                                                                               
 18. See, e.g., DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL, 1-2  (3d ed. 1999) (describing the popularity of opium use medically and recrea-
tionally during the nineteenth century and noting that opium use and trade was restricted 
only by tariff until 1909). 
 19. For some of the academic works central to establishing this narrative, see general-
ly MUSTO, supra note 18; TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY: LAW, DRUGS, AND 
MORAL JUDGMENT (1970); JOSEPH R. GUSFIELD, SYMBOLIC CRUSADE: STATUS POLITICS AND 
THE AMERICAN TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963). For a more recent work that effectively 
summarizes and updates this narrative, see PROVINE, supra note 10; see also Erik Grant 
Luna, Our Vietnam: The Prohibition Apocalypse, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 483, 486-512 (1997) 
(summarizing the history of American drug policy in terms largely consistent with these 
works and with this Article).
 20. This thesis has not gone unchallenged. For works that are at least skeptical of the 
idea that drug policy has primarily been about attacking disfavored social groups, see, for 
example, BAKALAR & GRINSPOON, supra note 11, at 68-72 (discussing forces that have con-
tributed to modern drug control policies and emphasizing the fact that “drugs are not just 
symbols; they are substances with distinct chemical properties and physical and psycholog-
ical effects”); GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39-40 (“Naturally, then, many 
people think that racial prejudice inspired the hostility toward cocaine . . .  . But we suspect 
that racial prejudice was ancillary.”); Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial 
Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255-56 (1994) (critiquing scholarship 
and a then-recent court decision equating crack-powder cocaine disparity with racial target-
ing of African-Americans and arguing that police indifference to effects of crime on African-
American communities is a bigger problem and a more virulent form of racism). 
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here doubtlessly can be dangerous for personal use and lead to nega-
tive social consequences for the communities in which users21 live, 
the policy responses to those dangers and consequences are perhaps 
not those that rational legislatures would devise. 
1.   The Temperance Movement 
 While antidrug movements and legislation are twentieth-century 
developments, they were predated by a temperance movement against 
alcohol. Temperance advocates linked alcohol consumption to immi-
grant groups (particularly Irish and Italian immigrants) who were also 
at the time racialized as nonwhite.22 Advocates blamed alcohol con-
sumption among these groups for a host of social ills, including domes-
tic abuse, thievery, and violent crime.23 In examining the temperance 
movement’s reasons for drawing a connection between alcohol use and 
these social problems, Joseph Gusfield has argued that temperance 
“was one way in which a declining social elite tried to retain some of its 
social power and leadership.”24 The politics of temperance was focused 
on reinforcing both the distinction between the rural, middle-class, na-
tive Protestant and the poor urban immigrant and the social domin-
ance of the former.25 Still, in terms of operationalizing its goals, the 
temperance movement sought “regulatory prohibition”—preventing 
persons from accessing alcohol through civil and administrative rules, 
rather than through the use of criminal law. While temperance advo-
cates sought to eliminate the use of alcohol, individual use was never 
criminalized.26 In other words, while the temperance movement 
wished to limit consumption of alcohol, and cast its arguments in mor-
al terms, it did not seek to bring to bear the severe social stigma asso-
ciated with criminal conviction and punishment.27   
                                                                                                                               
 21. I refer throughout this Article to substance users, rather than substance addicts 
or abusers. As discussed below, not all persons who use drugs recreationally use them often 
or otherwise exhibit signs of addiction and abuse. 
 22. The classic account of the racial and ethnic politics at the heart of the temperance 
debate is GUSFIELD, supra note 19; cf.  MARY P. RYAN, CRADLE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS: THE 
FAMILY IN ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK, 1790-1865 (1981) (examining the milieu in which 
the American temperance movement first emerged and locating its impulse in a complex 
web of ethnic, class, and religious animosities). For two provocatively titled accounts of the 
ways in which American culture and politics once racialized particular European ethnic 
groups, see NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE (1996); DAVID ROEDIGER,
WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE: THE
STRANGE JOURNEY FROM ELLIS ISLAND TO THE SUBURBS (2006). 
 23. See, e.g., Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 323. 
 24. GUSFIELD, supra note 19, at 5-6 (arguing that temperance was essential to distin-
guishing the middle class, the hard worker, and the native American from the lower class, 
the layabout, and the immigrant). 
 25. Id. at 6, 55-57.  
 26. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 323. 
 27. The Temperance Movement did enjoy short-lived success in the form of the Vols-
tead Act and the Twenty-First Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (1919), re-
pealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933); National Prohibition Act (Volstead Act), 41 Stat. 
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2.   The Racialization of Opiates and Narcotics 
 Early efforts to restrict access to substances such as opium, co-
caine, and marijuana similarly involved regulatory prohibition rather 
than the use of criminal law. Preliminary state laws required pre-
scriptions for or otherwise limited the ability of consumers to pur-
chase opium and cocaine.28
 The linkage between concern about particular social groups and 
increased regulations of substances associated with that group, first 
noted with regard to the Temperance Movement, manifested itself in 
new ways during the early twentieth century. As David Musto ar-
gues, during that era, drug addiction became associated with “foreign 
groups and internal minorities who were already actively feared and 
the objects of elaborate and massive social and legal restraints.”29 In 
particular, drug use was tied to Chinese immigrants and African 
Americans. Americans associated opium smoking, for example, with 
Chinese immigrants, against whom they were already mobilizing 
other restrictive legal tools (particularly immigration controls). 30
 Initially, the response to increased concern about drug use was 
once again regulatory. For example, the Harrison Narcotics Act,31
adopted by Congress in 1914, required producers and distributors to 
register with the government, track transactions, and pay special 
taxes for handling drugs; unregistered persons could purchase drugs 
only by prescription or for medical use.32 Still, unlawful possession of 
a drug was not criminalized; it might furnish evidence that the tax 
and regulatory schemes had been violated, but it did not subject the 
                                                                                                                               
305 (1919), repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (1933). States retain wide latitude to re-
gulate alcohol under the Twenty-First Amendment, but the great bulk of jurisdictions 
permit the sale of alcohol and limit themselves to time, place, and manner restrictions 
(such as laws confining sales to particular days, hours, or locations, limiting the ability of 
buyers to purchase small, inexpensive “minibottles,” prohibiting overservice, restricting 
drinking for persons under the age of twenty-one, preventing restaurants from serving al-
cohol on Sundays, or prohibiting public drunkenness). Even jurisdictions that prohibit the 
sale of intoxicating liquors do not criminalize “responsible” use of alcohol by persons over 
the age of twenty-one. 
 For a new and interesting take on the relationship between alcohol and drug regulation, 
see GEORGE FISHER, MARRIED TO ALCOHOL: THE DRUG WAR’S MORAL ROOTS (forthcoming).  
 28. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 40 (as of 1912, fourteen states had 
established school-based drug education to warn about cocaine and opium; as of 1914, for-
ty-six states had some restrictions on cocaine purchases, and twenty-nine states had some 
restrictions for opium purchases).  
 29. MUSTO, supra note 18, at 5. 
 30. See id. at 3; GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 185 (noting a shift in public at-
titudes about opiates from a sympathetic association with white, wounded, morphine-addicted 
Civil War soldiers to negative associations with opium-using Chinese laborers). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914). 
 32. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 41 (describing the Act). 
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violator to criminal sanctions. And to the extent that states prohi-
bited narcotics distribution, enforcement was lax.33
 By 1931, the landscape had changed. As of 1931, thirty-six states 
made unauthorized possession of cocaine a criminal offense, and in 
1951, federal law began to impose mandatory prison sentences for co-
caine possession.34 While this shift to criminal regulation has never been 
fully explained, it does correlate with an explosion of racialized imagery 
and a deepening of social anxiety about minority groups. During this 
era, concern about the large Chinese labor force in western states hit a 
fever pitch. Stories about Chinese immigrants using opium to lure white 
women into sexual slavery proliferated. Similar complaints about the 
use of opium by other “inferior” and “debased” people—Italian, Jewish, 
and central European immigrants—began to appear; such individuals 
were thought to be engaging in behaviors “contrary to white supremacy 
and white morality.”35 By the end of World War II, heroin had largely 
supplanted opium as the opiate of choice, and “racial and social preju-
dices” against black and Hispanic users “helped solidify national atti-
tudes” against heroin and opium use.36
 After years of being considered a health tonic, American opinion of 
cocaine turned to one of censure, as cocaine use became associated in 
the popular mind with various disfavored social groups,37 in particu-
lar African Americans.38 Fear of cocaine-using African Americans 
came at a time when lynching, disenfranchisement, and legally-
enforced segregation were still central features of the American land-
scape.39 Some whites envisioned horrific encounters in which African 
Americas cocaine-users would develop violent, superhuman strength 
and would foil law enforcement attempts to subdue them; some sto-
ries went so far as to suggest that such cocaine users would act as if 
invulnerable to bullets.40 Narratives abounded about cocaine-fueled 
                                                                                                                               
 33. See MUSTO, supra note 18, at 9 (explaining that states generally lacked sufficient 
manpower to enforce narcotics restrictions). 
 34. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 42 (cataloging these changes). 
 35. GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 185. 
 36. Id. at 188. 
 37. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39; see also Preface to the Expanded 
Edition of MUSTO, supra note 18, at x (noting that cocaine, once viewed as “an ideal tonic,” 
was reconstructed as “the most dangerous of all drugs” by 1900). 
 38. See generally MUSTO, supra note 18, at 43-44 (noting the association between Afri-
can Americans and cocaine in a variety of sources). Ironically, African Americans did not in 
fact use cocaine in numbers greater than, or even equal to whites. See GRINSPOON &
BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 40 (arguing that African Americans probably had less access to 
cocaine because of their relative poverty, and noting that the best documented cocaine ad-
diction cases were white professional men, particularly doctors); see also MUSTO, supra
note 18, at 8. 
 39. See MUSTO, supra note 18, at 7. 
 40. See GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 39. 
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men raping Caucasian women.41 It is with regard to cocaine that the 
now-familiar narrative first became explicit: we must prohibit and 
criminalize drug possession to prevent dangerous people from access-
ing dangerous substances.42
3.   Marijuana (and LSD) 
 Marijuana legislation similarly dovetailed with prejudice. As ma-
rijuana use became linked with Mexican immigrants, government 
concern and expanded sanction followed apace.43 During the 1930s, 
for example, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics conducted a racially-
tinged educational campaign describing marijuana as such a potent 
criminological agent that a single use could transform an upstanding 
citizen into a violent criminal.44
 The history of marijuana regulation nicely illustrates that the dis-
favored subgroup theory is not uniformly about race, ethnicity, or 
immigration. In the 1960s and early 1970s, a new round of drug 
regulation followed quickly45 as some drugs—marijuana and LSD, in 
particular—became associated with a band of political and cultural 
dissenters.46 Drug use became an axis on which dissenters explicitly 
set themselves apart and drug policy served as a mechanism through 
which the cultural majority reinforced its status as the embodiment 
of moral norms.47 Through this lens, attention to drug use in the 
                                                                                                                               
 41. See id. at 38-39 (detailing how cocaine was linked in media articles to African-
American convicts, lower economic classes, Jewish vendors, prostitutes, and poorly-
behaved soldiers). 
 42. See id. at 40. Like with marijuana, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text, 
the cultural anxieties that spawned the crackdown on cocaine transcended race. Grinspoon 
and Bakalar argue that racial prejudice was probably ancillary to a general desire to keep 
cocaine out of the hands of all potentially “dangerous” persons, including white women who 
might be seduced or corrupted by exposure to cocaine. See id. 
 43. On the association of marijuana with Mexican immigrants, see, for example, H.
WAYNE MORGAN, DRUGS IN AMERICA: A SOCIAL HISTORY, 1800-1980 93-94 (1981). For the 
story of the passage of the first significant federal law regulating marijuana and the cli-
mate of panic that facilitated that legislation, see HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS:
STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 135-46 (1973). 
 44. See BECKER, supra note 43, at 135-46; GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 182. 
Grinspoon and Hedblom note that no data support or supported this assertion. Id. at 183. 
 45. The most famous (and probably the most draconian) laws adopted during this era 
were New York’s so-called “Rockefeller Drug Laws,” which (until their recent amendment) 
imposed significant mandatory prison sentences for relatively minor drug infractions. See, 
e.g., Act of May 8, 1973, ch. 276 §§220.21, 220.43, 1973 N.Y. Laws 371, 380-81 (codified as 
amended in N.Y. Penal Law) (classifying criminal possession of two or more ounces of a 
controlled substance and criminal sale of one or more ounces of a controlled substance as 
Class A-I felonies). 
 46. See Reinarman & Levine, Crack in Context, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17, 
at 7-8 (arguing that marijuana in the 1960s and 1970s became associated with youthful re-
bellion against achievement and opposition to the Vietnam War, creating a “dangerous” 
youth class and “a useful symbol in an essentially political conflict between cultures and 
generations.”). This analysis draws upon the earlier work of Professor Becker. See general-
ly BECKER, supra note, 43. 
 47. See Reinarman & Levine supra note 46.
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1960s and early 1970s was less about reducing the possible personal 
or social harm associated with drug use than it was about reinforcing 
the majority’s status; like in the periods preceding and following, 
drug legislation during this era was often a proxy for cultural contes-
tation between competing social groups. 
B.   Crackademic: The 1980s and Beyond 
 The crack cocaine panic of the late 1980s probably has received 
the most attention, in the scholarly press and in the popular media, 
of any of the various drug panics of the past century. Sociologists 
Craig Reinerman and Harry Levine have documented exhaustively 
and persuasively the press coverage of the crack cocaine “epidemic,” 
the timing of that coverage relative to documented trends in crack co-
caine use, the extent to which press coverage reflected accurate in-
formation about crack cocaine effects, and the effects of press and 
public response on crack cocaine litigation and legislation.48 During 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the “one way ratchet” turned with a 
vengeance. The resulting system of crack cocaine laws persists into 
the present: lengthier terms of imprisonment, mandatory minimum 
sentences, parole and probation ineligibility, and penalties that esca-
late with increased numbers of convictions.49
 Cocaine was not a new drug when coverage of a purported epidemic 
of crack cocaine use began. Cocaine, as discussed earlier, had been 
used throughout the twentieth century, and its use had long violated 
criminal law.50 In surveying cocaine use in the United States as of 
1976, Lester Greenspoon and James Bakalar observed that cocaine “is 
rapidly attaining unofficial respectability . . . . It is accepted as a rela-
tively innocuous stimulant, casually used by those who can afford it to 
brighten the day or the evening . . . . Use of cocaine is gradually 
spreading in the upper middle class.”51 Greenspoon and Bakalar noted 
that at the time that they were writing, “[w]ith a few minor exceptions, 
no one contends that coca causes any significant crime [or] violence.”52
 Whatever Greenspoon and Bakalar might have predicted about 
the trajectory of social attitudes towards cocaine in the mid-1970s, by 
the mid-1980s, the trajectory clearly changed, at least with respect to 
                                                                                                                               
 48. See generally Craig Reinarman & Harry G. Levine, Crack in the Rearview Mirror:  
Deconstructing Drug War Mythology, 31 SOC. JUST. 182 (2004); CRACK IN AMERICA, supra
note 17. 
 49. See, e.g., Reinarman & Levine, supra note 17, at 321-22 (arguing that such esca-
lating sanctions have typified the U.S. response to drugs and quoting government docu-
ments that demonstrate the intentionality of such a regime). 
 50. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 51. GRINSPOON & BAKALAR, supra note 17, at 64. 
 52. Id. at 218. 
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one particular form of cocaine—crack.53 Smoking cocaine to obtain a 
high was not new—cocaine users had for some time used cocaine by 
“freebasing.”54 What was new was the attention to and panic about 
smokable cocaine.  
 The media coverage of crack cocaine began in earnest in 1986, and 
was promptly distinguished by both its volume and its remarkable 
levels of hyperbole and disinformation.55 Newsweek quoted an expert 
who described crack as a drug that produced an “instantaneous ad-
diction” more severe than any other;56 the New York Times and 
Newsweek compared crack cocaine to an epidemic or plague;57 and 
media sources generally described the wildfire spread, epidemic use, 
plague proportions, and addictive properties of crack cocaine58 in 
ways that their own later coverage found factually incorrect.59 Crack 
cocaine was linked to violent crime.60 As Reinarman and Levine ar-
                                                                                                                               
 53. Crack cocaine is a smokeable form of cocaine produced by “cooking down” a mix-
ture of powder cocaine, water, and baking powder. While cocaine has long been present in 
this country and has been smoked extensively since at least the early 1970s, the diluted, 
relatively inexpensive “cooked down” cocaine that came to be know as “crack” emerged in 
urban areas in 1984 and 1985. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 1, 2 (explaining 
the emergence of “crack”). As Professors Reinarman and Levine explain “Crack was not a 
new drug . . . . Crack was a marketing innovation.” Id.
 54. See Beverly Xaviera Watkins & Mindy Thompson Fullilove, The Crack Epidemic 
and the Failure of Epidemic Reponse, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 377 (2001) 
(describing 1979 testimony before Congress warning of the dangers of “free-base cocaine”). 
 55. Reinarman and Levine describe the press coverage of crack cocaine as a “media 
frenzy,” noting that in July of 1986, “the three major TV networks offered seventy-four 
evening news segments on drugs, half of these about crack.” Reinarman & Levine, The 
Crack Attack:  Politics and Media in the Crack Scare, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17, 
at 19-22. See generally JIMMIE L. REEVES & RICHARD CAMPBELL, CRACKED COVERAGE:
TELEVISION NEWS, THE ANTI-COCAINE CRUSADE, AND THE REAGAN LEGACY (1994) (cata-
loging and critiquing television coverage of drugs during the 1980s and early 1990s); cf.
MARTIN TORGOFF, CAN’T FIND MY WAY HOME: AMERICA IN THE GREAT STONED AGE,
1945—2000, 350-57 (2004) (narrating the key mileposts of the press coverage and explain-
ing how press portrayal played into themes of a larger culture war). 
 56. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 3 (citing Kids and Cocaine NEWSWEEK,
Mar. 1, 1986, at 58-59). 
 57. See id. at 3-4; see also Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 24 (citing New York 
Times/CBS News polling data that indicated that in January of 1985, 1% of Americans 
considered drugs to be the most important problem facing the United States; by September 
of 1989, that figure had risen to 64%). 
 58. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 20-22 (describing in depth the nature 
and timeline of mass media coverage of crack cocaine and noting that “plague,” “epidemic,” 
and “crisis” were descriptors commonly employed in press coverage). 
 59. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 46, at 4 (noting that, by 1989 or 1990, many ma-
jor news outlets were running stories quietly critical of their own initial coverage of “crack”). 
 60. See, e.g., Paul J. Goldstein, et al., Crack and Homicide in New York City:  A Case 
Study in the Epidemiology of Violence, in CRACK IN AMERICA, supra note 17, at 113, 122-24 
(noting media coverage and political rhetoric about “crack-related murders” and finding, 
based on 1988 homicide data from New York City, that while a majority of drug-related homi-
cides in New York City did involve cocaine or crack cocaine, most of the homicides had to do 
with the risks of the illicit drug market, as opposed to the psychopharmacological effects of 
cocaine or crack cocaine); Watkins & Fullilove, supra note 54, at 375 (noting media coverage 
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gue, the overwhelming majority of young people in the United States, 
during the time of hysterical coverage, were not using crack cocaine, 
and the overwhelming majority of people who had used crack cocaine 
had not continued to use it with any frequency.61 By most measures, 
in the late 1980s, drug use generally—and cocaine use specifically—
was in decline.62 Despite the fact that fewer Americans were using 
drugs, by 1989, the majority of Americans polled identified the most 
important problem facing the United States as “drugs.”63
 Crack cocaine also produced headlines and prosecutions related to 
an alleged “crack baby” epidemic, where, per the media and other 
sources, crack cocaine caused large numbers of infants to suffer se-
vere, irreversible health problems resulting from maternal use of 
crack cocaine. In 1985 and 1986, major news outlets began reporting 
that crack cocaine-exposed babies might comprise a “biological un-
derclass” suffering from, among other things, permanent mental re-
tardation, deviance, and an inability to perform basic self-care 
tasks.64 The idea of a permanent underclass of crack-cocaine-ruined 
children captured the public imagination.65 Reports on the “crack ba-
by” phenomenon proved medically unfounded—cocaine exposure af-
fects newborns, but does not create a particular “crack baby” syn-
drome with the terrifying symptoms and developmental debilitation 
                                                                                                                               
of crack cocaine in 1985 and 1986 that, focusing on violence, described crack cocaine addiction 
as “growing at alarming rates” and creating “an authentic national crisis.”). 
 61. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 48, at 186 (noting that during the period of 
the crack cocaine scare into the early 2000s, fewer than five percent of eighteen to twenty-
nine year olds ever tried crack, and of those who had tried it, 80% had not used crack co-
caine within the past year and over 90% had not used it within the past month); id. at 188 
(noting that crack cocaine usage “did not spread far beyond the most marginalized and 
vulnerable segments of society”); id. at 189 (noting that per National Institute on Drug 
Abuse surveys, the use of crack cocaine among high school seniors declined every year from 
1986 through 1991, while media articles were writing about the “epidemic” spread of crack 
cocaine use). 
 62. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 18, 27-28 (surveying drug use data to 
conclude that by the time crack cocaine coverage began in earnest, drug use generally and 
cocaine and crack cocaine use specifically were in decline, and noting that 1982 was the 
high water mark for lifetime cocaine use among young Americans). Moreover, during the 
period in which media articles about crack cocaine proliferated, most cocaine users were 
“sniffing, rather than smoking,” the drug. Id. at 28. 
 63. See id., supra note 55, at 24 (citing New York Times/CBS News polling data). 
 64. See generally Reinarman & Levine, supra note 48, at 192 (describing the content of 
articles and features in Newsweek, the Washington Post, and on CBS Evening News); Loren 
Siegel, The Pregnancy Police Fight the War on Drugs, in CRACK IN AMERICA at 249, 255, supra
note 17, (summarizing late-1980s media articles about the “crack baby” phenomenon). 
 65. Chapters of Children Requiring a Caring Kommunity (C.R.A.C.K.) can be found in 
several major cities; the program pays women who are addicted to drugs $200 to undergo 
sterilization or use long-term birth control such as IUDs. See generally Adam B. Wolf, Note,
What Money Cannot Buy:  A Legislative Response to C.R.A.C.K., 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
173 (1999) (arguing for legislation to prevent C.R.A.C.K. from offering money in exchange 
for permanent sterilization or long-term birth control). The majority of women who have 
utilized the program are women of color. Id. at 178 (sixty-three percent of women who have 
participated in the C.R.A.C.K. program are African-American or Latina). 
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initially described.66 Rather, many of the health problems found with 
babies born to mothers who had used crack were attributable to lack 
of prenatal care, poor nutrition and personal care, and co-existing 
substance use such as tobacco and alcohol.67 The “crack baby” image 
has, however, endured, and has left in its wake legislative changes 
and creative prosecution strategies designed to apply criminal sanc-
tions to women who expose developing fetuses to crack.68
                                                                                                                               
 66. See, e.g., Deborah A. Frank et. al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early 
Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: A Systematic Review, 285 JAMA 1613, 
1619 (2001) (effects of prenatal cocaine exposure are indiscernible once tobacco and alcohol 
exposure are controlled); L.C. Mayesm, et al., Commentary: The Problem of Prenatal Co-
caine Exposure: A Rush to Judgment, 267 JAMA 406-08 (1992) (arguing, fairly soon after 
height of “crack baby” scare, that popular fears were likely overstated); Patrick Zickler, 
NIDA Studies Clarify Developmental Effects of Prenatal Cocaine Exposure,  14 NAT’L INST.
ON DRUG ABUSE NOTES (Sept. 1999), available at 
http://archives.drugabuse.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol14N3/Prenatal.html (summarizing the 
position of the National Institute on Drug Abuse that  cocaine delays motor skill and intel-
lectual development, but that such effects are “not as profound” as early reports indicated 
and that it is difficult for researches to isolate the effects of cocaine from those of poor pre-
natal care, poor self-care, coexisting drug use, and other factors known to negatively affect 
development); Cocaine Pharmacology, “Crack Babies,” Violence: Hearings Before the U.S. 
Sent’g Comm’n, (Feb. 25, 2002) (statement of Deborah Frank, M.D.), reprinted in 14 FED.
SENT’G REP. 191, 196 (2002) (concluding, based on ten years of study at a National Insti-
tute on Drug Abuse project following developmental and behavioral outcomes for crack co-
caine exposed babies, that crack cocaine does not affect babies differently than powder co-
caine; that the effects of the drug are similar to those caused by tobacco; that there is no 
“crack baby” syndrome; and that early studies identifying such a syndrome were deeply 
flawed); see also 846 ANNALS OF N. Y. ACAD. SCI., John A. Harvey & Barry E. Kosofsky, 
eds., COCAINE: EFFECTS ON THE DEVELOPING BRAIN, at xi (1998) (making similar argu-
ments). 
 Dr. Ira Chasnoff, whose early anecdotal observations of babies born to crack-using 
mothers helped fuel the medial coverage, concluded after further research that he had 
“never seen a ‘crack kid.’ ” Ira J. Chasnoff, Missing Pieces of the Puzzle, 15 
NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 287, 288 (1993). Dr. Deborah Frank, a leading expert in 
children’s’ failure to thrive, concluded that the public outcry for the punishment of sub-
stance-using mothers and the disenfranchisement of their children as an unsalvageable, 
almost demonic “biological underclass . . . rest[s] not on scientific findings but upon media 
hysteria fueled by selected anecdotes.” Deborah A. Frank, Commentary: Children Exposed 
to Cocaine Prenatally: Pieces of the Puzzle, 15 NEUROTOXICOLOGY & TERATOLOGY 298, 299 
(1993).
 67. See Ira Glasser & Loren Siegel, When Constitutional Rights Seem Too Extrava-
gant to Endure: The Crack Scare’s Impact on Civil Rights and Liberties, in CRACK IN 
AMERICA, supra note 17 at 229, 241-42. 
 68. Prosecutors have employed existing child abuse statutes to prosecute women who 
test positive for drug use during pregnancy or whose newborn infants test positive for illicit 
drug use, particularly cocaine use. Prosecution strategies have ranged from coercive (de-
signed to convince a drug-using pregnant women to seek treatment or face prosecution and 
incarceration) to directly punitive (criminally sanctioning women who use drugs while 
pregnant). See LAURA E. GÓMEZ, MISCONCEIVING MOTHERS: LEGISLATORS, PROSECUTORS,
AND THE POLITICS OF PRENATAL DRUG EXPOSURE 78 (1997). 
 These strategies generally have not survived scrutiny from reviewing courts. See, e.g.,
Siegel, supra note 64, at 249 (describing cases in North Carolina, Virginia, and New York 
where prosecutors initially charged women who ingested cocaine while pregnant with assault 
with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, felony child neglect, and endangering the welfare of 
a child; these indictments, as well as most similar indictments, were dismissed). In Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), for example, the United States Supreme Court re-
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 Crack cocaine was portrayed and perceived as something far more 
addictive and far more menacing than powder cocaine or any other 
drug. The legislative reaction to public and media concern about crack 
cocaine was swift and severe.69 States enacted new mandatory mini-
mum sentences requiring offenders to serve prison time; increased 
available statutory maximums; and in some cases, provided mandato-
ry life without parole for crack-cocaine offenses.70 At the federal level, 
Congress included among its responses the now-infamous “100:1 ra-
                                                                                                                               
jected one such program, a cooperative effort between the Medical University of South Caro-
lina, the Charleston, South Carolina Solicitor’s Office, the Department of Social Services, the 
County Substance Abuse Commission, and the local police. 532 U.S. at 71, 81-82. Per this 
program, pregnant patients suspected of illicit drug use were subjected to urine drug screens. 
Id. at 71. Patients who tested positive for cocaine use prior to 28 weeks could be charged with 
simple possession of cocaine; after 28 weeks, to possession and distribution to a person under 
the age of 18; and at delivery, with the additional offense of unlawful neglect of a child. Id. at 
71-72. The Supreme Court held that this program comprised a Fourth Amendment search 
that did not comport with the special needs exception from the generalized requirement of a 
warrant and probable cause. Id. at 81-82.   
 State courts have similarly rejected prosecutions of women for child abuse based on 
drug use during pregnancy. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 137 P.3d 1195, 1198 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2006) (refusing to extend state’s child abuse statute to cover fetuses). Though prosecutors 
have attempted to utilize a wide variety of statutes—including child abuse, child endan-
germent, and delivery of a controlled substance—most state courts similarly have declined 
to read existing statutes as holding drug-using pregnant women criminally responsible for 
the potential exposure of their fetuses. See, e.g., Reinesto v. Superior Court of Ariz., 894 
P.2d 733, 737 (AZ. Ct. App. 1995) (rejecting use of child abuse statute); People v. Hardy, 
469 N.W. 2d 50, 55 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (rejecting use of delivery of cocaine charge).; State 
v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (rejecting child endangerment charge); State v. 
Dunn, 916 P.2d 952, 956 (Wash. App. 1996) (rejecting use of mistreatment of child statute); 
cf. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 496 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting use of reck-
less homicide and related charges against mother who was drunk when she delivered a 
stillborn fetus).  South Carolina, on the other hand, has permitted women to be prosecuted 
for offenses based on fetal exposure to maternally ingested drugs. See State v. McKnight, 
576 S.E.2d 168, 174-75 (S.C. 2003) (permitting woman to be prosecuted for homicide by 
child abuse where woman had used cocaine during pregnancy and fetus was stillborn); 
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777, 782 (1997) (permitting child endangerment prosecution 
where pregnant woman ingested cocaine); see also Ellen Marrus, Crack Babies and the 
Constitution:  Ruminations About Addicted Pregnant Women After Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 47 VILL. L. REV. 299, 301-02 (2003) (describing various state strategies for 
prosecuting pregnant drug-using women and noting that courts generally have rejected 
such strategies). Women not charged specifically with offenses related to ingesting drugs 
while pregnant may face stiffer sentences from judges who believe that jail or prison might 
ensure that pregnant women stop using drugs. See Siegel, supra note 64, at 250-51. 
 Legislative efforts to create new statutes to permit specifically the prosecution of 
drug-using pregnant women, while popular, never led to specific sanctions against drug-
using pregnant women. See Lynn M. Paltrow et al. Governmental Responses to Pregnant 
Women Who Use Alcohol or Other Drugs, Part 1, WOMEN’S LAW PROJECT AND NAT’L
ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.drugpolicy.org/ 
library/governmental_response_p1.cfm. 
 69. See Reinarman & Levine, supra note 55, at 21 (noting that in 1986, “overwhelming 
majorities of both houses of Congress voted for new antidrug laws with long mandatory pris-
on terms, death sentences, and large increases in funding for police and prisons”). 
 70. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 601 U.S. 957, 1028 (1991) (rejecting an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to a Michigan law providing for a mandatory life sentence for pos-
session of a relatively minor amount of cocaine). 
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tio”—the United States Sentencing Guidelines require 100 grams of 
powder cocaine to trigger the same mandatory minimum sentence as 
one gram of crack cocaine, and this ratio is included in the Guidelines 
generally for cocaine and crack-cocaine offenses.71 These legislative 
responses to crack cocaine, which treated it as a new and more serious 
drug than powder cocaine, may explain some of the racial differences 
in incarceration rates.72 What the legislative response to crack cocaine 
did not include was much by way of a public health response; govern-
ment “focused less on standard public health practice and . . . more on 
the courts, the police, and the prisons.”73
 If by the time legislation and media articles were appearing, how-
ever, crack cocaine use—never particularly widespread—was on the 
decline, how can we explain the dramatic legislative response, which 
suggested that crack cocaine abuse was both rampant and on the rise? 
 Probably the most common explanation provided for the discon-
nect between the reaction to and the reality of crack cocaine has been 
that of race—white Americans were panicking about African Ameri-
cans, particularly young urban African-American men.74 Crack co-
caine use and trade was linked through media articles and legislative 
debates to violent offenses, degradation of urban centers, family 
breakdown, and a host of other social problems.75 A lack of sympa-
thetic identification on the part of Caucasian legislators and voters 
may have facilitated this linkage as well as the decision to deal with 
this constellation of perceived problems through incarceration and 
criminal control. 
 Whether or not enforcement of drug laws is racist in design or in-
tent, the argument goes, the War on Drugs has been in operation a 
war on African-Americans.76 For many scholars and civil rights lead-
                                                                                                                               
 71. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified 
as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1994)). 
 72. See, e.g., Troy Duster, Pattern, Purpose, and Race in the Drug War, in CRACK IN 
AMERICA, supra note 17, at 265-66 (describing differences in federal sentencing for powder 
and crack cocaine offenses and noting that various federal sentencing laws related to crack 
cocaine contribute to a pattern of longer sentences for African-American defendants). 
 73. Watkins & Fullilove, supra note 54, at 385-86. 
 74. In addition to the works of Reinarman & Levine, collected in CRACK IN AMERICA,
supra note 48, see the sources cited infra notes 76-77. 
 75. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.  
 76. See, e.g., Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity—The 
Data Tell Us that It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 87, 87 (2003) (not-
ing that the crack: powder sentencing differences are “particularly distressing because 
crack defendants are primarily black and powder defendants are primarily white and His-
panic, so the differential treatment can too easily be seen as a manifestation of racial dis-
crimination”); Duster, supra note 72, at 264-65 (citing statistics to the effect that while in 
the early 1990s, African-Americans comprised 15-20% of drug users, in most urban areas, 
they comprised half to two-thirds of persons arrested for drug offenses and attributing ra-
cial imbalances in arrest and prosecution rates to “the selective aim of the artillery in the 
drug war”); Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 241 (arguing that “fears about crack merged 
easily with racial fears”); cf. David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 
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ers, late twentieth century drug policy was “[t]he [n]ew Jim Crow.”77
Civil rights activists particularly decried the differences in the feder-
al sentencing guidelines for powder cocaine and crack cocaine, depict-
ing this dual sentencing scheme as a transparent attempt to punish 
African-American criminality more harshly than its white coun-
terpart.78 (Many scholars concur, arguing that the current racial im-
balances in incarceration rates are substantially attributable to ef-
forts to combat crack cocaine.)79
 Some people who have looked at the responses of government bod-
ies and the public in general to crack cocaine have theorized that part 
of the reaction was not only about race, but about the intersection be-
tween race and gender. Prosecutions of drug-using women have pri-
marily been aimed at African-American women,80 although drug use  
is fairly level among pregnant women of all races.81 The gender/race 
linkage has perhaps reflected a desire to control African-American 
women who are considered undesirable mothers and to prevent them 
                                                                                                                               
STAN. L. REV. 1283 (1995) (arguing that evidence is overwhelming that race is instrumen-
tal in explaining crack/powder cocaine disparity and faulting existing equal protection doc-
trine for not coming to same conclusion).  
 Some go even further in assessing the relationship between race and the governmen-
tal response to crack cocaine. Nkechi Taifa, currently a Senior Policy Analyst at the Open 
Society Policy Center, argues that the federal approach to crack cocaine investigation, 
prosecution, and sentencing “is not only a direct reflection of the institutionalization of rac-
ism in the criminal justice system, but of systematic genocide, generally, against Black 
people as well.” Nkechi Taifa, Beyond Institutionalized Racism:  The Genocidal Impact of 
Executive, Legislative & Judicial Decision-Making in the Crack Cocaine Fiasco, NAT’L B.
ASS’N MAG., Sept./Oct. 1996, at 13, 14-16 (arguing that crack cocaine sentences are not 
supported by empirical evidence and denote a “racially discriminatory drug enforcement 
policy,” and describing the federal crack: powder cocaine sentencing differences as “apar-
theid-type”). But see Kennedy, supra note 20, at 1267 (arguing that African Americans are 
harmed by under- rather than over-enforcement of drug laws); John P. Walters, Race and 
the War on Drugs, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 107, 144 (arguing that enforcement of drug laws 
has not reflected racism or produced racially disparate results). 
 77. See, e.g., Symposium, U.S. Drug Laws:  The New Jim Crow?, 10 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REV. 303 passim (2001); Ira Glasser, American Drug Laws: The New Jim Crow, 63 
ALB. L. REV. 703, 723 (2000). 
 78. See, e.g., Powder Cocaine, Crack Cocaine, and Race, Hearing Before the U.S. Sent. 
Comm’n, (Feb. 25, 2002) (Statement of Wade Henderson, Executive Director of the Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights) (arguing that federal drug policy disproportionately af-
fects African Americans because of the heightened penalties for crack cocaine as compared 
to powder cocaine—as well as racism in criminal investigation and prosecution, and calling 
for Guidelines changes that would reduce disparities), reprinted in 14 FED. SENT’G REP.
204, 205 (2002). 
 79. See, e.g., Blumstein, supra note 76, at 87; Duster, supra note 72, at 265 (noting 
that in Virginia, in 1983, 63% of new prison admits for drug offenses were white; by 1989, 
34% were white). 
 80. See Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 242. 
 81. See Ira J. Chasnoff, Harvey J. Landress, & Mark E. Barrett, The Prevalence of Illicit 
Drug or Alcohol Use During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas 
County, Florida, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1202, 1204 (Apr. 26, 1990) (finding that in Pinellas 
County, Florida, while among pregnant women screened, 15.4% of white women and 14.1% of 
African-American women tested positive for drugs, African-American women were ten times 
more likely to be reported for substance abuse); Siegel, supra note 64, at 251. 
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from continuing to reproduce.82 For example, critiques of the “Child-
ren Requiring a Caring Kommunity” or “Project Prevention” program 
(“CRACK”), which offers drug-addicted women two hundred dollars 
in exchange for sterilization, have argued that the program is an at-
tempt to regulate “bad” mothers—largely poor, African-American 
women.83   
 Not all critiques of U.S. crack cocaine policy center on race. Wil-
liam Stuntz, for example, has described the response to crack cocaine 
in terms of class.84 Poor people are easier to spot using and trading 
drugs—they do so in public, on street corners, and in densely-
populated city centers where police may easily patrol, observe, and 
make arrests. More affluent citizens can conceal illicit activity with 
suburban remoteness, rolling lawns, and spacious homes. Poor people 
are reliant on appointed, indigent counsel, while affluent citizens can 
hire a choice of counsel and put up greater roadblocks to prosecution. 
The cost and effort of pursuing poor people, who are more likely to 
use and trade in crack cocaine, versus wealthier people, who might 
be more likely to use other drugs, makes the poor a more attractive 
target for law enforcement and prosecutors.85
 The response to crack cocaine has thus been the subject of numer-
ous academic critiques. At the center of most has been the thesis that 
the reaction to crack cocaine, publicly and legislatively, was overreac-
tion fueled by panic and deeply embedded in volatile patterns of race, 
class, and gender. 
III.   METHADEMIC!
 Methamphetamine is not a recent drug innovation; the substance 
has been around for ninety years and has been the subject of varying 
amounts of media coverage and legislative action for some time. Be-
ginning in 2004 and 2005, however, legislators, media outlets, and 
private citizens began paying increased attention to methampheta-
                                                                                                                               
 82. See, e.g.,  Deleso Alford Washington, “Every Shut Eye, Ain’t Sleep”:  Exploring the 
Impact of Crack Cocaine Sentencing and the Illusion of Reproductive Rights for Black 
Women from a Critical Race Feminist Perspective, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
123, 133-36 (2005). 
 83. See, e.g., Renee Chelian, Remarks on the “CRACK” Program:  Coercing Women’s 
Reproductive Choices, 5 J.L. SOC’Y. 187, 193-94 (2003) (describing C.R.A.C.K.’s outreach to 
various social service providers and agencies and arguing that the program targets poor, 
minority women); Sheila C. Cummings, Foreword:  Is CRACK the Cure? 5 J. L. SOC’Y 1, 5-6 
(2003) (describing the C.R.A.C.K program);  Dana Hirschenbaum, Note, When CRACK Is 
the Only Choice:  The Effect of a Negative Right of Privacy on Drug-Addicted Women, 15 
BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 327, 327-28 (2000) (noting that advertisements for the C.R.A.C.K. 
program are, by design, placed primarily in poor urban neighborhoods). 
 84. William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1795 (1998).  
 85. See id.; see also Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 235 (noting that, during the 
1980s, large-scale, aggressive drug sweeps focused on poor, minority, urban neighborhoods, 
“where drug dealing tended to be open and easy to detect”). 
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mine as a social problem, and all fifty states adopted new legislation 
related to methamphetamine. It is this period which I refer to as a 
“methademic,”86 a period of public and political panic about a per-
ceived, raging new epidemic of drug abuse. 
 In this Part, I provide an overview of methamphetamine’s history 
and a synopsis of recent legislative responses to this perceived epi-
demic of methamphetamine addiction. In Subpart A, I briefly explain 
the characteristics of methamphetamine, media coverage of metham-
phetamine, and trends in methamphetamine use and abuse. In Sub-
part B, I summarize the legislative response to methamphetamine 
from 2004 forward—particularly, the enactment of prevention-based 
laws designed to curtail methamphetamine use and production by 
discouraging people from experimenting with the drug and curtailing 
the availability of the drug’s ingredients. 
A.   Methamphetamine Use as an “Epidemic” 
 Methamphetamine, also referred to in its various forms as “ice,” 
“crystal,” “crank,” “speed,” and a variety of other slang terms,87 is a 
stimulant drug that acts on the central nervous system to produce a 
chemical high by stimulating the release of dopamine.88 Depending 
on its form, methamphetamine can be snorted, injected, ingested, or 
smoked, and the method of use affects the rapidity with which the 
body processes the drug and the onset of the user’s high.89 Metham-
phetamine can be physiologically addictive according to medical defi-
nitions of addiction,90 and repeated usage of the drug is associated 
with impaired dopamine production and other side effects.91 Me-
                                                                                                                               
 86. References to the purported methamphetamine epidemic as a “methademic” have 
been fairly frequent. See, e.g., Jim Lynch, County Combats Growing Meth Crisis: Authori-
ties in Pierce County, Wash. Say the Easily Made Drug Poses Crime, Health and Environ-
mental Threats, OREGONIAN, Aug. 20, 2000, at A21. 
 87. Many articles catalog methamphetamine slang. For one particularly colorful list, 
see Douglas Morris, Methamphetamines: Types, Forms, Effects, and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 32 NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW. CHAMPION MAG., Jan. 2009, at 20 (“Metham-
phetamine is known by a plethora of nicknames including, inter alia, meth, crank, speed, 
chicken feed, crystal, go-fast, shabu, glass, ice, strawberry quick, and methlies quick.”). 
 88. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., Methamphetamine: Abuse and Addiction,
2006 NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE RESEARCH REPORT SERIES 3-4. 
 89. Methamphetamine is produced in two forms—powder and crystal (and is in this 
way similar to cocaine). Powdered methamphetamine is generally ingested, injected, or in-
haled. Jane Carlisle Maxwell, Methamphetamine: Epidemiological and Research Implica-
tions for the Legal Field, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1121, 1121-22 (2006). Crystal forms of metham-
phetamine are generally either smoked or heated and inhaled. Id.
 90. See, e.g., Anna M. Johnson, A Perspective Regarding Treatment for Methamphe-
tamine Addiction, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1435, 1435-36 (2006). 
 91. For a thorough summary of methamphetamine’s major effects and side effects, see 
Avi Brisman, Meth Chic and the Tyranny of the Immediate: Reflections on the Culture-
Drug/Drug-Crime Relationships, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1273, 1275-83 (2006). 
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thamphetamine is classified federally as a Schedule II drug,92 but is 
available legally, by prescription, under the trade name Desoxyn or 
in generic form.93
 Concern about methamphetamine use and addiction also is not 
new. Amphetamines, which are chemically similar to methampheta-
mine,94 historically received rounds of media and legislative atten-
tion.95 Domestic methamphetamine “home-cooking” probably had its 
origin in California in the 1950s, as Korean War veterans may have 
imported methamphetamine production methods when they returned 
from service.96 Major media sources covered methamphetamine abuse 
by long-haul truckers and motorcycle gangs during the 1970s and 
1980s, when articles described the popularity of the drug’s use for 
maintaining alertness on overnight drives.97 A smattering of news ar-
ticles and academic works documented methamphetamine production 
and distribution, particularly in the western United States, in the 
late 1980s98  and into the 1990s.99 In particular, between 1996 and 
1999, a handful of news articles either predicted that a methamphe-
tamine “epidemic” was imminent or described such an epidemic as 
having already taken root.100     
                                                                                                                               
 92. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§801-971 (2006). Methamphetamine was 
added to the Act as a Schedule II drug under in 1971. See Schedules of Controlled Sub-
stances: Amphetamine, Methamphetamine and Optical Isomers, 36 FED. REG. 12,734 (July 
7, 1971).
 93. On the legal uses of methamphetamine, see JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 7; U.S. 
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 88, at 2. 
 94. Methamphetamine is a “synthetic” drug that draws its active ingredient from its 
“parent drug” amphetamine. It is produced by chemically adding a second methyl-group 
molecule to an amphetamine compound. On the chemical relationship between metham-
phetamine and amphetamine, see, for example, Brisman, supra note 91, at 1275-77, 1276-
77 n.5. 
 95. The major academic work on the history of American use and regulation of am-
phetamine is GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, passim.
 96. On the early history of methamphetamine production and use, including in particu-
lar its substantial use by military personnel during World War II and the Korean War, see, 
for example, DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, FORCES OF HABIT: DRUGS AND THE MAKING OF THE 
MODERN WORLD 76-84 (2001); M. Douglas Anglin et al., History of the Methamphetamine 
Problem, 32 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 137, 137-38 (2000); Brisman, supra note 91, at 1303-04; 
see also GRINSPOON & HEDBLOM, supra note 17, at 18-20, 24-25 (discussing amphetamine use 
among U.S. soldiers and veterans of World War II and the Korean War, albeit without distin-
guishing between methamphetamine and other amphetamines). 
97. See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 10, at 7 (describing use of methamphetamine by 
long-haul truckers and motorcycle gangs in the 1960, 1970s, and 1980s). 
 98. See, e.g., Jonathan Beaty, Southern California Tales of the Crank, TIME, Apr. 24, 
1989, at 10 available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,957521,00.html 
(describing use and manufacture in Southern California); Richard Lacayo, The Menace of 
Ice, TIME, Sept. 18, 1989, at 28 (describing methamphetamine as Hawaii’s number one 
drug and noting that methamphetamine was making “serious inroads” in other states and 
that “speed kings” were planning “vast expansions in production”). 
 99. See, e.g., T. Christian Miller, O.C. Meth Lab Bust Points up Boom in Drug, L.A.
TIMES, July 22, 1993, at 1. 
 100. See, e.g., Charlie Goodyear, Methamphetamine Abuse Called Epidemic, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRON. Apr. 8, 1999, at A15 (describing an existing “epidemic”); Anastasia 
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 The latest round of press articles describing the menace of me-
thamphetamine surfaced in 2004 and 2005.101 In those two years, ma-
jor American newspapers and news magazine ran over one hundred 
articles discussing and bemoaning the scourge of meth. Accounts con-
tinued to portray methamphetamine use as an “epidemic”102 or a 
“siege.”103 Coverage was quick to emphasize the prevalence of me-
thamphetamine in rural areas and to draw connections between me-
thamphetamine use and rural poverty.104  (A second strand of coverage 
that never gained quite as much traction emphasized the use of me-
thamphetamine by urban, gay men and expressed concern about the 
possibility that meth use among gay men might retrigger the AIDS ep-
idemic.105) Media coverage emphasized a variety of problems related to 
                                                                                                                               
Toufexis, There Is No Safe Speed: Three Toddlers’ Deaths Spotlight the Nation’s Latest 
Drug Epidemic, TIME, Jan. 8, 1996, at 37, available at http://www.time.com/time/ 
magazine/article/0,9171,983922,00.html (quoting a Drug Enforcement Administration official 
as describing 1996 methamphetamine use as “absolutely epidemic”); Christopher S. Wren, 
Sharp Rise in Use of Methamphetamines Generates Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1996, at A16 
(describing a “startling rise” in methamphetamine use in western states); Walter Kirn, Crank,
TIME, June 22, 1998, at 24, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ 
0,9263,7601980622,00.html  (describing methamphetamine use as “a powdery plague on Ameri-
ca’s heartland”). 
 101. See, e.g., John-Manuel Andriote, Meth Comes out of the Closet, WASH. POST, Nov. 
8, 2005, at F1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2005/11/04/AR2005110402178.html (describing signs of increasing concern about metham-
phetamine); Joyce Pellino Crane, Lowell Police Voice Concern on Methamphetamine 
Threat, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 16, 2005, at A24 (describing police in several Massachusetts 
communities as being concerned, based on recent methamphetamine laboratory discove-
ries, that methamphetamine, “epidemic” in the Midwest, was establishing a toehold in 
Massachusetts); David J. Jefferson et al., America’s Most Dangerous Drug, NEWSWEEK,
Aug. 8, 2005, at 41 (offering hyperbolic account of impending crisis); Dirk Johnson, Policing 
a Rural Plague, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 2004, at 41 (describing the use of methamphetamine 
as “soaring” and small towns as “[f]eeling under siege”); Paul F. Walsh, Jr., “May You Live 
in Interesting Times . . .” , 39 PROSECUTOR, Aug. 2005, at 5,  available at http:// 
www.ndaa.org/ndaa/about/president_message_july_august_2005.html (President of Na-
tional District Attorneys Association describing methamphetamine as “continu[ing] to roar 
eastward across our country leaving destruction, pain and new criminal issues for prosecu-
tors to contend with”); United States: Instant Pleasure, Instant Ageing; Methamphetamine,  
ECONOMIST, June 18, 2005, at 47 (noting that methamphetamine “is in the eyes of many, 
America’s leading drug problem”). 
 102. E.g., Crane, supra note 101, at A24. 
 103. E.g., Johnson, supra note 101, at 41. 
 104. See, e.g., id. (describing methamphetamine as a “rural plague”); Cameron McWhirter 
& Jill Young Miller, Meth Stalks Rural Georgia: Cheap, Easily Manufactured Stimulant Is 
Countryside’s Fastest-Growing Drug Problem, and Abuse Can Be Deadly, ATLANTA J. &
CONST., June 6, 2004, at C1 (describing linkage between methamphetamine use and rural 
poverty); see also Joh, supra note 10, at 180 (identifying the rural white poor as one of the two 
groups who the media associated with methamphetamine use during this period). 
 105. Professor Joh treats this strand of coverage as on par with the depiction of 
methamphetamine as a drug of the rural poor. See Joh, supra note 10, at 181-82; see also 
id. at 181 n.32 (collecting media sources from this period depicting purported epidemic of 
meth use among urban, gay men); David J. Jefferson et. al., Party, Play — And Pay, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 28, 2005, at 38 (describing a “Party and Play” phenomenon in which gay 
men use methamphetamine prior to having risky sexual relations, and arguing that 
methamphetamine use is associated with HIV transmission rates). 
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methamphetamine manufacturing and consumption, paying particular 
attention to the explosiveness of the ingredients used in manufactur-
ing the drug,106 the alleged horrific effects of the drug on the oral 
health of its users,107 and the many ways in which meth endangered 
children.108 Advertising campaigns against methamphetamine include 
warnings of the environmental hazards posed to innocent bystanders 
when local residents manufacture methamphetamine.109
 Has this coverage reflected a real, recent epidemic of metham-
phetamine use? As was the case with crack cocaine, the media cover-
age has not appeared to accurately depict trends in methampheta-
mine usage.110 Methamphetamine use does not appear, by credible 
measures, to be on an upswing.111 Among teenagers, methampheta-
mine use has steadily declined over the past five years, and was in 
decline during the 2005 uptick in methamphetamine articles.112
                                                                                                                               
 106. See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, The Fallout:  ‘I Felt My Face Just Melting,’
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 2005, at 44. 
 107. See, e.g., Paul Harris Crossville, Tragic Orphans of U.S. Drugs Epidemic: Crystal 
Meth Hits Rural Areas, OBSERVER, Aug. 14, 2005, at 22 (describing “meth mouth”). Wheth-
er the effects of “meth mouth” are actually attributable to methamphetamine use quickly 
became an object of substantial debate. Cf. Jack Shafer, The Meth-Mouth Myth: Our Latest 
Moral Panic, SLATE, Aug. 9, 2005, at A.21, http://www.slate.com/id/2124160 (expressing 
skepticism). 
 108. See, e.g., Crossville, supra note 107, at 22. 
 109. See, e.g., Steve Suo, Nationwide Ad Campaign Takes Aim at Methamphetamine 
Abuse, OREGONIAN, Dec. 3, 2005, at C7 (describing a national anti-methamphetamine  
televised commercial campaign by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America, including one 
dramatization in which a small child is exposed to methamphetamine fumes from a 
neighbor’s manufacturing enterprise, and a second dramatization in which a confused non-
smoker reports coughing symptoms to his medical care provider while a narrator intones 
that the man’s new home is a former methamphetamine lab). 
 110. In contrast with earlier drug panics, some media sources openly doubted—and even 
directly critiqued—their competitors’ hyperbolic coverage of methamphetamine. In particular, 
Slate columnist Jack Shafer has mobilized data to aggressively critique some of the more ex-
aggerated media accounts. See, e.g., Jack Shafer, Meth Madness at Newsweek:  This Is Your 
Magazine on Drugs, SLATE, Jan. 31, 2007, at 5, http://www.slate.com/id/2123838; Shafer, su-
pra note 107. 
 111. A 2006 study suggests that approximately 731,000 Americans were using me-
thamphetamine in 2006, a number that was roughly unchanged from four years earlier. 
See Joh, supra note 10, at 180 n.24. Quest Diagnostics, the largest administrator of 
workplace drug tests in the United States, reported similar overall rates of usage, but also 
noted a steeper pattern of decline. See Quest Diagnostics, USE OF METHAMPHETAMINE 
AMONG U.S. WORKERS AND JOB APPLICANTS DROPS 22 PERCENT IN 2007 AND COCAINE USE
SLOWS DRAMATICALLY, in DRUG TESTING INDEX, (2008), available at http:// 
www.questdiagnostics.com/employersolutions/dti/2008_03/dti_index.html (reporting that 
positive test results for methamphetamine peaked at 0.33% in 2004 and declined by be-
tween 15 and 36 percent each year between 2004 and 2007). Those rates are substantially 
lower than the positive test results for marijuana (2.59%) or cocaine (0.70%). See id. As 
happened with crack cocaine, to the extent that methamphetamine use was at any point on 
an upswing—Quest reports that positive methamphetamine screens increased by some 
73% between 2002 and 2004—by the time media and public attention turned to the drug, 
usage, never particularly widespread, was on the decline. Id.
 112. According to in-school surveys conducted by the University of Michigan’s Monitoring 
the Future study and supported by grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse and the 
National Institutes of Health, methamphetamine use among teenagers has dropped fairly 
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While words like “epidemic” pepper articles about methamphetamine 
use,113 most Americans do not use and have never used methamphe-
tamine,114 and the 2007 usage figures continue to show decline, sug-
gesting that most Americans never will. While methamphetamine 
use doubtlessly can be devastating, and while usage rates likely have 
increased in particular areas or communities, there is not what 
                                                                                                                               
steadily since the survey began tracking self-reported methamphetamine use figures in 1999. 
In 1999, 4.5% of eighth graders, 7.3% of tenth graders, and 8.2% of twelfth graders reported 
having ever used methamphetamine; the 2005 figures were 3.1%, 4.1%, and 4.5% respective-
ly, and the latest available figures, from 2007, put lifetime usage at 1.8%, 2.8%, and 3.0% re-
spectively. See L.D. Johnson, et al., Overall, Illicit Drug Use by American Teens Continues 
Gradual Decline in 2007, Table 1 http://monitoringthefuture.org/data/ 
07data.html#2007data-drugs. According to usage figures from 2007, more teenagers have 
tried marijuana, inhalants, non-LSD hallucinogens, MDMA (“ecstasy”), cocaine, other amphe-
tamines, and tranquilizers. See id. Similarly, teens reporting that they have used metham-
phetamine at any point within the past year declined (for eighth, tenth, and twelfth graders 
respectively) from 3.2%, 4.6%, and 4.7% in 1999, to 1.8%, 2.9%, and 2.5%, respectively, in 
2005; the 2007 figures are 1.1, 1.5%, and 1.7%. See id., at Table 2. Self-reported methamphe-
tamine use within the past thirty days follows the same pattern; in 1999, 1.1% of eighth 
graders, 1.8% of tenth graders, and 1.7% of twelfth graders reported such recent use; by 2005, 
those percentages had declined to 0.7%, 1.1%, and 0.9%, and they stood at 0.6%, 0.4%, and 
0.6% in 2007. See id., at Table 3. These survey results are similar to those produced by the 
Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS), a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention survey 
that includes self-reported youth engagement in various risky behaviors, including drug use; 
according to the YRBS, among 9th through 12th graders, the percentage of students who re-
ported that they ever had used methamphetamines showed “no change” between 1999 and 
2001 (hovering between 9.1 and 9.8%), and fell to 6.2% by 2005 and 4.4% by 2007. See CTR.
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRENDS IN THE PREVALENCE OF MARIJUANA, COCAINE, AND OTHER 
ILLEGAL DRUG USE—NATIONAL YRBS: 1991-2007, available at http:// 
www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/us_drug_trend_yrbs.pdf. 
 113. See supra notes 100-09. 
 114. As noted above, see supra note 111, the most recent systematic data suggests that 
there are less than three-quarters of a million current users of methamphetamine. Accord-
ing to 2006 data from the Department of Health and Human Services’ Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration, as of 2006, there were approximately 731,000 
current methamphetamine users in the United States (about 0.3% of the population); about 
5.8% of Americans reported that they had tried methamphetamine. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF APPLIED 
STUDIES, RESULTS FROM THE 2006 NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH:
NATIONAL FINDINGS 18, available at http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/nsduh/2k6nsduh/ 
2k6Results.pdf. The same survey reports that about 5.2 million Americans were, in 2006, 
current recreational users of prescription drugs; 2.4 million were current cocaine users; 
and 14.8 million were marijuana users. Id. at 16, 18. See also KING, supra note 10, at 4-14 
(reviewing several different drug usage studies, including emergency room admissions and 
positive drug tests among arrestees, and concluding that methamphetamine is used regu-
larly by a very small percentage of Americans, and that the rate of people using metham-
phetamine monthly has been stable over the past several years). Despite this data, even 
articles in law journals make statements to the effect that methamphetamine “has become 
one of the most abused drugs in America.” Lauren Grau, Comment, Cutting off the Build-
ing Blocks to Methamphetamine Production: A Global Solution to Methamphetamine 
Abuse, 30 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 157, 161 (2007). Methamphetamine use does, however, vary by 
location—while positive drug tests among arrestees are fairly constant across jurisdictions, 
positive drug tests for methamphetamine specifically vary widely, reflecting provincial dif-
ferences in drugs of choice. See KING, supra note 10, at 13-14; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., supra, at 27 (reporting that methamphetamine use was approximately five times 
more widespread in the West than in the Northeast). 
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would appear to be a large-scale, widespread upswing in methamphe-
tamine use. 
 While “epidemic” thus appears an inflation of actual usage rates, 
the racial depictions of methamphetamine users are more accurate:  
most methamphetamine users are Caucasian.115 About half of federal 
methamphetamine DEA arrests are of individuals identified as Cau-
casian; the majority of non-Caucasian methamphetamine DEA arres-
tees are Latino/Hispanic.116
B.   Legislative Responses to Methamphetamine 
 The central and most pervasive legislative responses to the per-
ceived methamphetamine epidemic have been to constrain the ability 
of would-be home manufacturers to obtain necessary production in-
gredients and to educate the public against methamphetamine use 
and production. Recipes for methamphetamine production are readily 
available via print media and the internet117 and use ingredients and 
hardware that historically have been easy to purchase at neighbor-
hood stores.118 The most important of those ingredients, pseudoephe-
drine—the active ingredient in certain kinds of cold medications—
has anchored legislative action, as states, followed by Congress, have 
sought to limit the ability of prospective manufacturers to access ne-
cessary materials as well as to discourage people from becoming new 
users or producers of methamphetamine. 
 In fact, the legislative response to methamphetamine in some areas 
preceded the perception of a regional methamphetamine problem. 
When, for example, Massachusetts State Senator Harriette L. Chan-
dler, D-Worcester, introduced legislation seeking to restrict public ac- 
                                                                                                                               
 115. See, e.g., David E. Smith, Gantt P. Galloway & Richard B. Seymour, Methamphe-
tamine Abuse, Violence and Appropriate Treatment, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 661, 667 (1997) 
(providing data). 
 116. See Mark Motivans, U.S. Dep’t of Just. Stat., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
BULLETIN: FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2005 at 2 (Sept. 2008), available at http:// 
www.bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs05.pdf (reporting that of 6,461 methamphetamine 
arrests conducted by the DEA in 2005, 3,154 of the arrestees were white; 2,809 Hispan-
ic/Latino; 173 Asian/Pacific Islander; 143 black/African American; and 61 American In-
dian/Alaskan Native). 
 117. Debra S. Peterson and R. Michael Jennings, Methamphetamine A Recipe for Disas-
ter, 73 J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2004, at 7 (noting that bookstores, internet sites, and even court 
decisions provide recipes for manufacturing methamphetamine). For a description of the me-
thamphetamine production process in laymen’s language, see id. at 8,44. 
 118. Methamphetamine is similar in chemical structure to ephedrine and pseudoephe-
drine, making it relatively easy to synthesize in home- or vehicle-based “laboratories.” See, 
e.g., Samantha S. McKinley & Joseph L. Fink III, “Speed Limits”:  States’ Approaches to Regu-
lating Access to Methamphetamine Chemical Precursors with Statutes and Regulations Limit-
ing Pseudoephedrine Availability, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1217, 1220-21 (2006). Recipes generally in-
clude cold medication (for the active ingredient, ephedrine or pseudoephedrine), lithium ex-
tracted from lithium batteries, ether, and anhydrous ammonia or iodine (depending on the 
methamphetamine form produced), as well as other substances such as paint thinner, freon, 
drain cleaner, and lye. Id. at 1221-22.
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cess to pseudoephedrine, she did not argue that this restriction was 
necessary to combat current methamphetamine production in the 
state; rather, she argued that such restrictions were necessary to avoid 
developing a methamphetamine problem in the state.119 Similarly, the 
Partnership for a Drug Free America justified a major new govern-
ment-backed public education campaign against methamphetamine 
manufacturing, launched in late 2005, as “true prevention” and an at-
tempt to “deal[] with [the drug] before it’s a crisis.”120
 The focus on education, treatment, and pseudoephedrine restric-
tion has not been one settled on accidently; legislatures and execu-
tives explicitly and intentionally have privileged methamphetamine-
reduction options rather than focusing on criminal sanctions.121 In 
the following Sections, I describe state and federal legislative res-
ponses to the perceived epidemic of methamphetamine use and man-
ufacture. While jurisdictions have in some cases increased criminal 
penalties—in particular, where legislatures have believed that “inno-
cent” nonusers, particularly children, are endangered—by and large, 
legislators have focused on preventative rather than incarcerative 
strategies, a response we might not have been conditioned to expect 
from the literature surrounding legislative reactions to the crack co-
caine “epidemic” in particular. 
                                                                                                                               
 119. Dan Lamothe, ‘Meth’ Eyed as Latest Menace, REPUBLICAN, Sept. 26, 2005, at A1 
(quoting State Senator Chandler as saying, “[w]e’re looking to put [pseudoephedrine] be-
hind the counter because we’re looking to avoid the problem that places like Oregon have 
had . . . . Nothing happens across the country that doesn’t eventually happen here”); see al-
so Brian Scheid, Officials on the Watch for Meth in Bucks, INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 7, 2005, at 
3B (quoting Chief of County Detectives in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, as saying that me-
thamphetamine could move into his area, and arguing for proactive action because “[i]t’s 
perfectly ripe for this problem to get out of hand if we don’t get our hands around it first”); 
Jennifer Sinco Kelleher, For Now, Meth’s LI Presence on Fire Island, NEWSDAY, Mar.15, 
2004, at A42 (quoting a local Nassau County officer, commenting on crystal methamphe-
tamine, as saying: “It’s virtually nonexistent . . . . You keep hearing it’s going to come, but 
it hasn’t hit here yet”).  
 120. Kenneth C. Crowe II, Ad Campaign Targets Meth Lab Dangers: TV Commercials are 
Designed to Shock to Mobilize Communities, ALBANY TIMES UNION, Dec. 13, 2005, at B8. 
 121. For example, when Congress began considering comprehensive anti-
methamphetamine legislation in 2006, one of the prominent bills included harsh new man-
datory minimum sentences. See Cassidy, supra note 10, at 134. However, after considering 
the matter, the House Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to strip them from the bill. 
See id.
 Some individuals involved in administering the legislative response to methamphe-
tamine have made similar observations. For example, Anna M. Johnson, Director of Opera-
tions at a North Dakota recovery center, notes that “[d]uring North Dakota’s Fifty-Ninth 
Legislative Assembly in 2005, senators and representatives from across the state voted to 
respond to the methamphetamine epidemic with treatment rather than incarceration.” 
Johnson, supra note 90, at 1437. As Johnson notes, the relevant bill passed the North Da-
kota Senate by a 47-0 vote and the North Dakota House by an 88-5 vote (88 yeas, 5 nays, 1 
absent). See id., at 1437 n.8. 
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1.   Precursor Regulations 
 The primary way in which legislatures have responded to a per-
ceived methamphetamine epidemic has been to make it more difficult 
for prospective methamphetamine manufacturers to obtain essential 
production ingredients. Many confused persons first encounter this 
central form of legislative response when attempting to self-medicate 
cold and allergy symptoms. Puzzled drug store patrons must request 
that Sudafed bottles be liberated from locked cabinets and behind-
counter stashes; provide identification as they might for alcohol pur-
chase; observe limits on the number of capsules they can purchase; 
and submit information to the commercial establishment to permit 
either the store or law enforcement officials to track the quantity and 
frequency of pseudoephedrine purchases. These changes in commer-
cial practice comport with restrictions that states pioneered and the 
United States Patriot Act now essentially requires. 
 Restrictions on the ability to purchase precursor ingredients for 
methamphetamine manufacture are not in themselves new. Western 
states began restricting precursor sales in the 1980s,122 and Congress 
passed a half-hearted measure that imposed some restrictions in 
1996 in response to the first significant round of media stories posit-
ing a coming meth “epidemic.”123 However, as described below,124 the 
widespread introduction of precursor regulations did not occur until 
2004 to2005, when legislatures began to respond to the perceived ep-
idemic of drug use described above.125
 Prior to the recent round of relatively uniform restrictions, some 
prosecutors attempted to utilize then-existing criminal law to convince 
merchants to monitor sales of items associated with methampheta-
mine manufacturing and to avoid selling items where they might be 
used to manufacture meth. Merchants were, for example, prosecuted 
under general conspiracy laws for selling items such as cold medica-
tion, lighter fluid, matches, and ether in quantities or combinations 
that, according to law enforcement officials, put the merchants on no-
tice that a customer intended to use the purchased items to manufac-
                                                                                                                               
 122. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11055(f)(1) (West Supp. 1990); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 37-2707(g)(1) (Supp. 1990); NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.146(2)(h) (Michie Supp. 
1989); OR. REV. STAT. §475.940 (1989); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37c-3(2)(p)-(q), 58-37c-4 
(1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.206 (g)(1) (West. Supp. 1990). 
 123. See generally Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-237, 110 Stat. 3099 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19, 21, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.). As commentators have noted, the 1996 Act was largely ineffective in regulating 
precursors as it provided a blanket exception to purchase restrictions for approved over-
the-counter cold medications. See, e.g., Jean C. O’Connor, Jamie F. Chriqui & Duane C. 
McBride, Developing Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Methamphetamine 
Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1165, 1177 (2006).  
 124. See infra notes 129-141and accompanying text. 
 125. See supra Part III.B. 
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ture methamphetamine.126 An individual who purchases or attempts to 
purchase such items in combinations and quantities that seem suspi-
cious may still be detained by law enforcement officers to investigate 
intent to manufacture methamphetamine.127 Some retailers voluntari-
ly moved pseudoephedrine products behind their counters prior to any 
specific legislation requiring them to do so.128   
 The specific set of legal changes described in this Section passed 
quickly and without organized opposition. Some drug companies re-
sisted restrictions on purchases and sales by lobbying against legisla-
tion,129  although those lobbying efforts proved unsuccessful. Also, 
some pharmaceutical manufacturers have replaced the pseudoephe-
drine in some cold medication products with phenylephrine, an active 
ingredient that may not be as effective as a decongestant.130
 Within the past few years, virtually all states have passed legisla-
tion that in essence formalizes the assumption that purchasing partic-
                                                                                                                               
 126.  In one high-profile law enforcement effort in Georgia, “Operation Meth Mer-
chant,” undercover agents went to stores in several counties, told clerks in slang terms that 
they planned to “cook” methamphetamine, and purchased combinations of products that, 
according to prosecutors, should have put merchants on notice that they were selling items 
to be pressed into service for methamphetamine manufacture. Defendants were prosecuted 
for violating federal statutes that criminalize (i) selling legal but regulated drugs with rea-
son to believe that the drugs are going to be used to manufacture illegal drugs, see 21 
U.S.C. § 841(c)(2) (2006), and (ii) selling  materials or products with reason to believe that 
they will be used to manufacture illegal drugs, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(7) (2006). See United 
States v. Patel, No. 4:05-CR-27-02, slip. op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.stopoperationmethmerchant.org/pdf/MotionDeniedOrder.pdf. Civil liberties 
groups and others criticized the operation for, as they perceived, targeting stores operated by 
South Asian immigrant families with limited English skills and a lack of knowledge of manu-
facturing mechanics and methamphetamine lingo, as well as for using an informant who may 
have been unreliable, leading to the arrests of misidentified suspects. See, e.g., Jay Bookman, 
Editorial, Meth Sting Pointed at South Asians, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 13, 2005, at A15 (not-
ing that forty-three of forty-nine convenience store clerks and owners arrested in Operation 
Meth Merchant were south Asian immigrants); Jay Bookman, War on Crystal Meth Cooks Up 
Many Flimsy Charges, ATLANTA J. CONST., Oct. 10, 2005, at A13 (criticizing operation); Fea-
ture: Federal Meth Precursor Sting Targeting South Asian Convenience Stores Draws Pro-
tests, ACLU Intervention, Jan. 13, 2006, http://stopthedrugwar.org/ 
chronicle/418/convenience.shtml (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). A federal district judge dis-
missed the collected defendant’s claim of selective prosecution. See United States v. Patel, No. 
4:05-CR-27-02, slip. op. at 3-4 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.stopoperationmethmerchant.org/pdf/MotionDeniedOrder.pdf.  
 127. See infra Part III.B.  
 128. See Jim Puzzanghera, Putting Cold, Flu Drugs Out of Reach, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, at 1A  (explaining that Walgreens, Target, Wal-Mart, Longs, and 
other stores in California put pseudoephedrine-containing products behind the counter in 
early 2005, prior to the passage of precursor restrictions requiring them to do so). 
 129. For example, Pfizer, the manufacturer of Sudafed, and the Consumer Healthcare 
Products Association lobbied unsuccessfully against Oklahoma’s Bill 2176, which requires 
pseudoephedrine purchasers to present identification and sign a registry. See Mark Schone, 
The Epidemic on Aisle 6, LEGAL AFF., Dec. 2004, available at http://www.legalaffairs.org/ 
issues/November-December-2004/feature_schone_novdec04.msp.  The Consumer Healthcare 
Products Association lobbied with similarly unavailing results in several other states. Id.
 130. Robert Cohen, Many Cold Meds Aren’t What They Used to Be, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-
TRIB., Nov. 24, 2006. 
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ular items denotes an intent to manufacture methamphetamine, and 
in general places the burden on stores to prevent customers from pur-
chasing precursor items.131 Oklahoma created the “model” for this sort 
of legislation in 2004, when it passed H.B. 2176.132 Legislators hope 
that by choking off ingredient supply lines, particularly the sizable 
quantities of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine essential to methamphe-
tamine manufacture, local mom-and-pop methamphetamine producers 
will be forced to shut down—positing that when “[y]ou control pseu-
doephedrine, you control the meth.”133 Restrictions on pseudoephedrine 
purchase and possession vary from state to state,134 and while (as dis-
cussed below) federal law now provides a floor for precursor purchase 
restrictions,135 state laws have the following general characteristics. 
 First, states limit the amount of pseudoephedrine products a cus-
tomer may purchase (without prescription) at any given time or loca-
tion. A customer may purchase a specified quantity of pseudoephe-
drine products at one store or from several stores within a certain pe-
riod of time.136 In order to ensure that customers are not assuming 
new identities; returning repeatedly to a store or a series of stores in 
an attempt to cobble together a number of small purchases (a tactic 
known as “smurfing”137); or otherwise attempting to circumvent pur-
chase restrictions, legislation requires stores to demand that custom-
ers produce identification at the time of purchase or to sign into a 
                                                                                                                               
 131. In 2005 alone, thirty-five states passed such laws, generally known as “meth pre-
cursor” restrictions, bringing the total number of states with such restrictions well over for-
ty. See Monica Cain & Cretson Dalmadge, The Effects of State-Level Methamphetamine 
Precursor Restriction on Drug Laboratory Seizures, 8 REV. BUS. RES. 36, 36 (2007) (summa-
rizing 2006 legislation). 
 132. See Scott Ehlers, State Legislative Affairs Update, NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. DEF. LAW.
CHAMPION MAG., Nov. 2005, at 58.   
 133. Gaylord Shaw, When Meth Hits Home/Oklahoma Trooper’s Routine Check Turns 
Fatal, Prompting Focus on a Powerful Drug Gaining Popularity, NEWSDAY, Mar. 15, 2004, 
at A6 (quoting an Oklahoma state narcotics bureau official in an article that describes mul-
tiple killings that state officials attribute to methamphetamine). 
 134. For one fairly complete list of state regulations, see DUANE C. MCBRIDE ET AL.,
INSTITUTE FOR PREVENTION OF ADDICTIONS, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE 
METHAMPHETAMINE PRECURSOR LAWS AND TRENDS IN SMALL TOXIC LABS (STL) SEIZURES
60-61 (2008), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/223467.pdf. 
 135. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (imposing restrictions and reporting re-
quirements on retailers who display and sell products identified as potential methamphe-
tamine precursors); see also Patricia Stanley, Comment, The Combat Methamphetamine 
Epidemic Act: New Protection or New Intrusion?, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 379, 404-05 (2007) 
(summarizing the relevant federal provisions). 
 136. For a summary of state purchase restrictions that notes some interesting differ-
ences between state laws, see O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1182-85; see also Stanley, 
supra note 135, at 393-94 (noting variations in state laws, in particular between states that 
simply limit the amount that can be purchased during a single transaction and states that 
limit the total amount that can be purchased within a given time period). 
 137. See, e.g., Andrew C. Goetz, Note, One Stop, No Stop, Two Stop, Terry Stop: Rea-
sonable Suspicion and Pseudoephedrine Purchases by Suspected Methamphetamine Manu-
facturers, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1573, 1584 (2007) (explaining the term). 
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hard-copy or electronic log book so that purchase amounts and pat-
terns can be tracked.138
 Second, state laws place requirements on retailers who vend 
products that contain pseudoephedrine. Jurisdictions mandate that 
stores monitor pseudoephedrine products, put pseudoephedrine 
products under the control of pharmacists, or keep products secured 
behind a counter or in a locked case; and report thefts and suspicious 
behavior to authorities.139 In this manner, some law enforcement 
functions are placed on retailers, who monitor customers and mer-
chandise to ensure compliance with the law. 
 Third, some states have criminalized possession of particular 
amounts of pseudoephedrine or permitted an inference of intent to 
manufacture from possession of a specified quantity of pseudoephe-
drine.140 While it may have always been possible to get a jury instruc-
tion to the effect that intent to manufacture methamphetamine can 
be inferred from the possession of a certain quantity or combination 
of precursor materials, this inference has been formalized by states 
into a statutory presumption.141
 The efficacy of the relatively new precursor restrictions is debata-
ble. Most law enforcement officials appear to believe that the restric-
tions have reduced the number of mom-and-pop methamphetamine 
labs, and media sources and police departments have reported fewer 
methamphetamine laboratory raids in many areas since restrictions 
have been put into place.142 Reduced numbers of laboratories detected 
                                                                                                                               
 138. See O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1184-85 (describing a variety of identifica-
tion and record-keeping requirements imposed by different states).  Since 2006, Oregon has 
required a prescription for the purchase of products containing pseudoephedrine. See OR.
REV. STAT. §475.950(2) (2008). Oregon Senator Ron Wyden has recently introduced federal 
legislation to impose a similar requirement, but the bill has made no significant legislative 
progress. See Dan Schiff, Pseudoephedrine Prescription Bill on the Way, OVER THE 
COUNTER TODAY (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.overthecountertoday.com/ 
2009/02/pseudoephedrine-prescription-bill-on-the-way.html (noting that Senator Wyden 
has drafted and was planning on introducing such a ban in “the Meth Lab Elimination Act 
of 2009”). 
 139. For a summary of some such laws, see Stanley, supra note 135, at 395 (discussing 
restrictions imposed on retailers in Alabama, Missouri, and Oklahoma). 
 140. See, e.g., IND. CODE §35-48-4-14.5 (2006) (classifying possession of more than ten 
grams of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine as a Class D felony); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. §780.113.1 
(2004) (criminalizing possession of any amount of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine if—but on-
ly if—the state can establish an intent to manufacture or distribute methamphetamine); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §44-53-375(E)(1) (2005) (criminalizing the possession of more than twelve 
grams of pseudoephedrine or ephedrine). 
 141. See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-29-313(2)(c)(ii) (2005) (“[P]ossession of one or 
more products containing more than twenty-four (24) grams of ephedrine or pseudoephe-
drine shall constitute a rebuttable presumption of intent to use the product as a precursor 
to methamphetamine or another controlled substance.”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §2-332(B) 
(2004) (creating a rebuttable presumption that possession of more than nine grams of 
pseudoephedrine evinces an intent to produce methamphetamine). 
 142. See, e.g., Paul Bird, 3 Stores Cited in Meth Checks, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 17, 
2005, at 1S (reporting that, as of December of 2005, state police had responded to 941 calls 
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can, however, reflect shifting law enforcement priorities or changing 
manufacturing strategies. Law enforcement officers might have other 
local crises, such as the contemporaneous uptick in violent crime,143
that shift their attention away from methamphetamine production; 
they might rely on precursor restrictions in part to reduce their need to 
actively work to detect methamphetamine laboratories; mom–and-pop 
producers might shift locations in order to be less detectable (sites that 
are more rural, more professional “superlabs,” or mobile such as auto-
mobile trunks). Also, as discussed below, reducing local production 
may or may not reduce local methamphetamine use, although it cer-
tainly would reduce the number of persons in the United States ex-
posed to toxic and volatile methamphetamine production chemicals. 
 State precursor restrictions of course leave several methods of 
pseudoephedrine procurement open for the enterprising methamphe-
tamine manufacturer. Not all jurisdictions passed precursor restric-
tions in the circa-2004 era, and options such as mail-order companies 
were not covered by state precursor statutes. In 2006, Congress 
stepped in to close some of these loopholes and establish national 
standards, adopting the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act as 
part and parcel of a larger bill expanding and reauthorizing the Pa-
triot Act.144 The Methamphetamine Act created nationwide pseudoe-
phedrine restrictions that largely mirrored the restrictions recently 
put into place in most states and restricted the international and 
mail-order sale of pseudoephedrine.145
                                                                                                                               
about methamphetamine labs, compared to 1061 at the same point the year prior, before pre-
cursor restrictions were enacted); Vic Ryckaert, Meth Makers Outside U.S. Help Fill Void,
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Dec. 15, 2005, at 4A (quoting John P. Walters, Director of the White 
House Office of National Drug Control Policy, as saying that all Midwestern states had seen 
declines in home methamphetamine manufacturing since precursor restrictions were 
enacted); Michael A. Lindenberger, Law May Be Cutting Number of Meth Labs, (Louisville) 
COURIER-JOURNAL, Nov. 4, 2005, at A1 (officials  in Kentucky credit precursor restrictions 
with reducing methamphetamine laboratory seizures). But see Matthew Hathaway, New Law 
Isn’t Reducing Meth Lab Seizures, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Dec. 14, 2005, at C5 (Jefferson 
County, Missouri drug task force members did not observe a drop in methamphetamine lab 
raids in the period following the implementation of precursor regulations in Missouri; accord-
ing to one official: “After the law went into effect, the (meth) cooks were confused for a few 
weeks . . . but after that it was back to the same-old, same-old”).  
 Efforts to study the impact of such laws empirically—rather than anecdotally—are 
still in their infancy. For some of the early efforts in this vein, see, for example, MCBRIDE
ET AL., supra note 134; Cain & Dalmadge, supra note 131. 
 143. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Violent Crime, a Sticky Issue for White House, Shows Steeper 
Rise, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 2007, at A7 (noting that, after a long decline, violent crime 
rates rose in 2006 and rose more steeply in 2005). 
 144. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005,  Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 
192 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). 
 145. For the core restrictions adopted by the Act, see 21 U.S.C. § 830(e)(1)(A)(i) (impos-
ing restrictions and reporting requirements on retailers who display and sell products 
identified as potential methamphetamine precursors and on the mail order purchase of 
such products). For an effective summary of the new federal provisions, see Stanley, supra 
note 135, at 404-05. Congress expressly indicated that the new federal restrictions were 
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2.   Methamphetamine Registries 
 Some states have created methamphetamine registries, similar to 
sex offender registries, to permit private citizens to track persons con-
victed of methamphetamine offenses. Tennessee pioneered the me-
thamphetamine registry in 2005, providing public access to a web site 
that offers the names, dates of birth, offense category, and date of con-
viction for persons convicted of methamphetamine manufacturing of-
fenses.146 Legislatures passed bills creating similar registries in several 
other states.147 These registries in general are less user-friendly and 
provide far less personal information than do sex offender registries.148
Registries are not costless—they require administration and updates—
but they are not as costly as continued incarceration. 
                                                                                                                               
meant only as a floor and were not meant to preempt more stringent state restrictions. See
Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act §711(g), 120 Stat. at 263 (codified at 21 U.S.C. 
§802 note). 
 146. See Tennessee Meth Offender Database, http://www.tennesseeanytime.org/methor-
app/search.jsp (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 147. See, e.g., Illinois Methamphetamine Manufacture Registry, http://www.isp.state.il.us/ 
meth/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); Minnesota Methamphetamine Offender Registry, 
https://mor.state.mn.us/OffenderSearch.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); Sexual or Violent Of-
fender Registry, MT Dep’t of Justice, http://www.doj.mt.gov/svor/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010).  
 148. National guidelines for sex offender registries provide minimum standards for 
state sex offender registries. According to these minimum standards, states should post to 
websites fairly comprehensive information about sex offenders—their names, addresses, 
vehicle descriptions and license plate numbers, physical descriptions and current photo-
graphs of registered persons, and the sex offenses for which the person has been convicted. 
DEP’T  OF JUST., THE NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION AND 
NOTIFICATION 33-34 (2008). 
 When Oklahoma’s state legislature considered legislation to create a registry, Speak-
er Todd Hiett, who introduced the bill, argued that “Oklahomans have the right to know if 
a meth lab could be in their own neighborhood or community,” while Representative John 
Nance, who carried the bill, offered that the registry would “be a useful tool to families as 
they look to buy a home. You need to be able to check out all aspects of that home’s history, 
including whether there has been a meth lab close by.” Press Release, Speaker of the Okla-
homa House of Representatives Todd Hiett (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http: 
/www.okhouse.gov/OkhouseMedia/pressroom.aspx?NewsID=512.  The focus was on protect-
ing property values and avoiding nuisances, not on stigmatizing offenders. Even still, Ok-
lahoma never adopted a registry, and most of the established registries have been even less 
useful. See infra notes 149-150. 
 The Illinois registry requires a last name to be submitted in order to search for a 
convicted person; unlike sex offender registries, a private citizen accessing the registry 
cannot, for example, generate a neighborhood map showing where persons convicted of me-
thamphetamine offenses reside. The publicly-accessed record provides the convicted per-
son’s full name, date of birth, and offense of conviction; no photograph or address may be 
publicly accessed. See Illinois Methamphetamine Registry, supra note 147. In contrast, the 
Illinois sex offender registry, available at http://www.isp.state.il.us/sor/, permits the gener-
al public to access lists of sex offenders by city and zip code; to, in addition to viewing dates 
of birth and offenses of conviction, access maps of sex offender residence locations; and to 
view photographs, full physical descriptions, specific offense details, and complete ad-
dresses of registered sex offenders. Other states with methamphetamine registries similar-
ly provide less information and less ease of access than offered through sex offender regi-
stries. Compare Tennessee’s methamphetamine registry, supra note 146, which permits 
citizens to search for persons convicted of methamphetamine manufacturing offenses by 
county or by last name with a first initial, and provides the name, birth date, offense title,  
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 This methamphetamine registration trend never took root in most 
states, however. While a handful of states ultimately passed legislation 
creating registries, most states never formally considered methamphe-
tamine registries as a strategy for reducing methamphetamine produc-
tion, and not all jurisdictions that have considered methamphetamine 
registries actually created them.149 In 2006, for example, Georgia, Okla-
homa, West Virginia, and Washington State all considered legislation to 
create registries but ultimately declined to do so.150
 The story of state legislative dalliance with methamphetamine re-
gistries is a telling allegory. Legislators looking for ways to crack 
down on methamphetamine floated proposals modeled on earlier get-
tough-on-crime strategies. Their bills were quickly reshaped to be 
less punitive and more public health oriented than the earlier legisla-
tion. Even then, when the costs of the programs became apparent 
and were weighed against their limited benefits, most such proposals 
quietly died on the vine. 
3.   Property Regulations 
 The methamphetamine-producing methods described above carry, 
in addition to immediate risks to producers,151 longer-term problems 
of contamination and waste.152 Methamphetamine manufacture gen-
                                                                                                                               
and date of conviction, with Tennessee’s sex offender registry, available at 
http://www.ticic.state.tn.us/sorinternet/sosearch.aspx, which also permits searches by last 
name, city, and zip code, and which provides a photograph, address, and registration status 
information for listed persons. Minnesota’s methamphetamine registry permits searches by 
last name or by county. See Minnesota Methamphetamine Registry, supra note 147. Regi-
stry records include the convicted person’s full name, date of birth, and registry-triggering 
offense, and provide a link to the person’s publicly accessible criminal history, if desired. 
The registry does not provide a photo, address, or further physical or biographical descrip-
tion. In contrast, the state’s sex offender registry permits searches by county, city, zip code, 
or name, and provides a photograph, physical description, address, and specific offense de-
tails for the registrant. 
 149. For examples of bills introduced with great fanfare that were never adopted, see Ga. 
H. B. 793, (2006), available at http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2007_08/fulltext/hb793.htm.; 
Okla. H. B. 3121, (2008), available at http://webserver1.lsb.state.ok.us/2007-08bills/HB/ 
HB3121_hflr.rtf; W. Va. H. B. 4525, (2006), available at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/ 
bill_status/bills_text.cfm?billdoc=hb4525%20intr.htm&yr=2010&sesstype=RS&i=4525. 
 150. For national coverage of Georgia’s then-pending legislation, see Kari Huus, Click 
Here for Drug Offenders: Internet Listings Have Popular Appeal, But do they Really Pro-
tect the Public? , MSNBC, (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15971396/. Press 
coverage throughout 2006 identified Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia, as other 
states considering the adoption of a registry. See, e.g., id. As of August 2008, none of those 
states had adopted a meth registry. See Jeff Lambert, Tennessee’s Meth Offender Registry 
Copied and Reviled, TIMES-NEWS, Aug. 24, 2008, http://www.timesnews.net/ 
article.php?id=9007847 (reporting that only Tennessee, Illinois, Minnesota, Montana, and 
Kansas had established methamphetamine registries). 
 151. For reports of methamphetamine laboratory explosions, see for example, Man In-
jured in Arnold Meth Lab Explosion, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 4, 2008; Deputies 
Blame Explosion on Meth Lab, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 19, 2006, at G2. 
 152. See, e.g., McKinley & Fink, supra note 118, at 1223 (describing the environmental 
concerns arising from methamphetamine manufacture). News coverage of methampheta-
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erates hazardous byproducts, including chemicals that do not easily 
degrade. Those chemicals can contaminate the property where the 
methamphetamine was produced, groundwater and soil in surround-
ing areas, and any other property or water supply where byproducts 
are dumped. Future property occupants face contamination hazards 
and possible health complications from exposure to toxins. These 
problems are neither new nor newly identified.153
 These concerns about the environmental consequences of me-
thamphetamine have spurred diverse policy responses and proposals. 
The Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act requires the United 
States Transportation Department and the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency to begin tracking and reporting on some chemicals that 
are byproducts of methamphetamine production.154 Some states have 
adopted legislation putting notice and cleanup burdens on people 
seeking to transfer property, to ensure that unwary purchasers are 
not exposed to toxins.155 Some state and federal programs offer to pay 
some or all of the costs of cleaning up the toxic byproducts of me-
thamphetamine when they are found on the property of innocent in-
dividuals.156 Advertising campaigns against methamphetamine have 
prominently incorporated warnings about the environmental hazards 
posed to innocent bystanders when local residents manufacture me-
thamphetamine.157 Some commentators have advocated the aggres-
                                                                                                                               
mine production has routinely made reference to the environmental hazards posed by 
home methamphetamine laboratories. See, e.g., Hal Marcovitz, Congressmen Call for Lim-
its on Sales of Cold Medication; Bill Aimed at Stopping Crystal Meth Operators, Two Tell 
Bucks County, THE MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.) , Oct. 7, 2005, at B1 (describing how 
methamphetamine lab operators dump hazardous waste into woods and streams). For re-
cent academic discussion of environmental issues raised by methamphetamine production, 
see O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1172-73, 1187. See generally Smith, Cooking Up So-
lutions, supra note 10; Cheri-Lynn Wortham, Comment, Methamphetamine and Cocaine 
Manufacturing Effects on the Environment and Agriculture, 17 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L.
REV. 343 (2008). 
 153. Several student notes on the environmental problems associated with 
methamphetamine labs appeared prior to the recent flurry of news articles about 
methamphetamine. See, e.g., Tamara B. Maher, Note, Legal Liabilities Faced by Owners of 
Property Contaminated by Clandestine Methamphetamine Laboratories: The Oregon 
Approach, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 325 (1991); Anna S. Vogt, Comment, The Mess Left 
Behind: Regulating the Cleanup of Former Methamphetamine Laboratories, 38 IDAHO L.
REV. 251 (2001).  States had also previously enacted statutes for the purpose of addressing 
environmental hazards associated specifically with methamphetamine production. See, 
e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 453.855 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 64.44.005 (2009). These statutes 
include provisions that require property owners to warn potential purchasers about 
contamination. See, e.g.., OR. REV. STAT. § 105.464(I)(8)(F)&(H)(2007); WASH REV. CODE § 
64.06.020 (2009).   
 154. See Jeff Wyble, Methamphetamine—The New Epidemic, 11 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. &
L. 115, 140 (2007) (collecting and describing scattered provisions of the Act that impose 
new environmental reporting requirements). 
 155. See O’Connor et al., supra note 123, at 1187 (describing adoption of such reforms 
in Colorado and South Dakota). 
 156. See Wortham, supra note 152, at 349-53 (describing some such programs). 
 157. See, e.g., Suo, supra note 109, at C7. 
2010]                     METHADEMIC 875 
sive use of nuisance and zoning laws to regulate, eliminate, and sanc-
tion methamphetamine laboratories.158
4.   Child-Protective Measures 
 Legislative responses to methamphetamine have often focused—
both rhetorically and substantively—on the dangers that the manu-
facture and use of the drug pose to children.159 Many such efforts 
have been educative or ameliorative. For example, the Combat Me-
thamphetamine Epidemic Act included a twenty million dollar grant 
program to assist states in establishing programs to assist children 
exposed to methamphetamine.160 Sponsors of a similar House provi-
sion emphasized the children’s innocence; as Representative Zach 
Wamp stated, “Through no fault of their own these children have 
been placed in an unconscionable position because their parents or 
guardians surrendered their wills to an incredibly addictive drug,” 
describing affected children as “orphans of the despicable meth 
trade.”161 Public education campaigns have, likewise, focused on dan-
gers to children.162
 As might be expected when children are involved, initiatives in 
this area have also, at times, been punitive. While it is possible that 
a variety of methamphetamine offenses might expose a parent or 
guardian to traditional child neglect or abuse charges, many states 
have enacted specific “child abuse by methamphetamine” statues 
that make it an offense to expose a child or other helpless dependant 
to the production of methamphetamine or have passed sentence en-
hancement provisions that increase the punishment of those con-
victed of methamphetamine manufacturing if children are present 
during the manufacturing of the drug.163 These statutes seek to limit 
the extent to which “innocents” in custodial care are exposed to toxic 
chemicals and possible explosions and fires through punishing par-
ents and caregivers who facilitate that exposure. 
                                                                                                                               
 158. See, e.g., Smith, America’s Methamphetamine Crisis, supra note 10, at 624-34 (ad-
vocating aggressive use of nuisance laws). 
 159. Expressions of particular concern for children “victimized” by methamphetamine 
are a familiar trope in the academic literature, see, e.g., Smith, America’s Methampheta-
mine Crisis, supra note 10, at 609 (describing children as one of “two classes of individuals” 
who “most consistently suffer from the harms of methamphetamine production”); in media 
coverage, see, e.g., Joh, supra note 10, at 183 (reviewing media coverage of the so-called 
meth “epidemic” and concluding that “the methamphetamine addict was construed as an 
immoral or amoral monster, whose addiction wreaked havoc upon children”); and in gov-
ernment reports, see, e.g., KAREN SWETLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CHILDREN AT 
CLANDESTINE METHAMPHETAMINE LABS: HELPING METH’S YOUNGEST VICTIMS (2003).  
 160. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, § 755; see 
also Wyble, supra note 153, at 141 (explaining the intended uses of this grant money).  
 161. Press Release, Rep. Jim Cooper, Meth-Endangered Children to Benefit from New 
Grant Program, U.S. FED. NEWS, Dec. 14, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 20389395. 
 162. See, e.g., Suo, supra note 109, at C7 (describing one such commercial). 
 163. For a discussion of these developments, see infra Part III.B.  
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5.   Methamphetamine Prisons 
 During the round of concern about crack-cocaine offenses, many 
people were sent to prison; the prisons were general prisons with a 
variety of offender types that may or may not have had specific sub-
stance abuse treatment or other rehabilitative programs available.   
 In contrast, in response to methamphetamine, Montana and Illi-
nois have created prisons specifically designed to house persons who 
have been convicted of offenses and are addicted to methampheta-
mine,164 while several other states have set up special units within 
other prisons dedicated to meth-addicted prisoners.165 While obvious-
ly incarcerative, these prisons reflect a more nuanced—and more 
ambivalent—response to the problems raised by substance abuse. 
Certainly, prisons specially dedicated to the rehabilitative needs of a 
specific class of substance abusers were not part of prior legislative 
and executive responses to perceived drug epidemics. 
6.   Drug Treatment Courts 
 In confronting the problems posed by methamphetamine, states 
have increasingly utilized specialized drug courts to deal with a sig-
nificant segment of those charged with violating criminal drug sta-
tutes. Many states have made drug courts a centerpiece of their anti-
methamphetamine efforts.166 For example, Montana—a state that 
considers itself one of the hardest-hit regions of the country in terms 
of its methamphetamine problem—has established family drug court 
programs in several jurisdictions, serving both adults and juve-
niles.167 The federal government has also endorsed the strategy, mak-
ing over $70 million available annually to states to implement and 
maintain such courts.168
                                                                                                                               
 164. See Catharine Skipp & Arian Campo-Flores, Addiction: A “Meth Prison” Move-
ment, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 24, 2006 (describing the new prisons in those states). 
 165. See id. (describing experiences in other states, notably Indiana); see also NORTH 
DAKOTA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, METH PRISONS IN OTHER STATES (2006) (document pre-
pared for North Dakota Assembly Budget Committee on Government Services), available 
at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/59-2005/docs/pdf/79288.pdf (evaluating success of 
“meth prisons” in Illinois, Indiana, and Montana in response to proposal for similar prison 
in North Dakota). 
 166. See, e.g., C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG COURTS: AN
EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR COMMUNITIES FACING METHAMPHETAMINE (2005), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pdf/MethDrugCourts.pdf (discussing successful drug court 
programs in California, Utah, and Washington State); Melody Finnemore, Juggling Act: 
Rapidly Changing Judiciary Requires Judges to Take on More Complex Roles, 66 OR. ST. B
BUL., Dec. 2005, at 17, 17 (discussing use of drug courts to combat methamphetamine in 
Oregon and crucial role of judges in such courts); Ed Kemmick, Drug Treatment Court: A 
Glimmer of Hope in the Fight Against Meth, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Aug. 24, 2005 (discussing 
Montana’s commitment to utilizing drug courts to combat its meth problem). 
 167. See Kemmick, supra note 166 (describing program). 
 168. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 751-54 
(2006). The federal commitment to drug courts was not unconditional; in order to obtain 
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 Drug courts generally provide alternatives to incarceration for par-
ticipating defendants.169 Defendants whose offenses are considered 
linked to drug addiction—whether or not the offense charged is a drug 
offense—may be identified by judges, service personnel, prosecutors, or 
defense attorneys as persons who would benefit from substance abuse 
treatment, and who should avoid incarceration and/or conviction if 
they successfully complete treatment. These programs usually follow 
one of two formats: either the defendant enters the alternative pro-
gram after arrest, but prior to conviction,170 or, alternatively, the de-
fendant may plead guilty and have an incarcerative sentence sus-
pended pending completion of the drug court program.171 Completion of 
the program might lead to no conviction, the dismissal of a conviction, 
or a conviction that does not lead to a jail or prison sentence.172    
 Drug courts usually require the participant to complete drug 
abuse treatment, maintain employment or student status, be closely 
supervised by program personnel, and receive other services, such as 
family or mental health services, that the court might consider ne-
cessary.173 While drug courts are superficially similar to probation in 
that defendants are supervised and a failure to comply with the pro-
gram’s terms may lead to consequences for the defendant, the level of 
supervision provided to defendants is generally more intensive (de-
fendants often appear in front of judges for status reports, and may 
attend several meetings with treatment providers and other rehabi-
                                                                                                                               
these funds states were required to design their drug courts to include mandatory drug 
testing and to impose graduated sanctions for failures to pass such test. See id. at §753;  cf.
HUDDLESTON, supra note 166 (mentioning a federal report encouraging states to adopt 
drug courts). 
 169. On drug courts generally, see Eric J. Miller, Drugs, Courts, and the New Penology,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV.417, 417-25 (2009) (summarizing history, theory, and functions of 
modern drug courts). 
 170. See, e.g., California Courts, Drug Court, http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/programs/ 
collab/drug.htm (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (“A preplea diversion program allows criminal 
proceedings to be suspended while the defendant participates in a program involving coun-
seling, drug testing, education, or other requirements. If the defendant successfully com-
pletes the program, the criminal charges are dismissed.”). In some such systems, defen-
dants may be required to sign confessions before entering the drug court program, so that, 
should they not successfully complete the program, the prosecutor’s burden of proof at trial 
will be easy to meet.  
 171. See, e.g., Felony Drug Court:  Statement from Judge Thomas A. Teodosio, http:// 
www.summitcpcourt.net/fdc.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010) (noting that the drug courts 
in Summit County, Ohio “will be based upon a post-adjudication model”). 
 172. For comparison of the different consequences of completing and failing to complete 
different kinds of drug court programs, see, for example, JAMES L. NOLAN, REINVENTING 
JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 41 (2001); Hon. Peggy Fulton Hora & 
Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of 
the Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717, 725-26, 750 (2008). 
 173. See generally, e.g., Hora & Stalcup, supra note 172, at 725-27 (describing normal 
operation of drug courts).  
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litative personnel each week), and intermittent noncompliance, such 
as an isolated positive drug test, generally is tolerated.174
 To some extent, the willingness of states to experiment with drug 
courts as a mechanism for dealing with methamphetamine users 
(and the federal government’s encouragement of this experimenta-
tion) may reflect a judgment that methamphetamine use presents a 
different set of problems—or attracts a different set of users—than 
other illegal drugs.175 However, drug treatment courts have existed 
for two decades now and have generally become more popular over 
the last few years.176 To the extent that methamphetamine users 
charged with criminal offenses are being diverted into specialized 
drug treatment courts, it is unclear whether they are benefiting from 
a special solicitude for meth users or from a general national trend.177
7.   Educational Programs 
 Both state and federal drug education programs, as well as cam-
paigns funded by nonprofit organizations, have created specific anti-
methamphetamine resources, including television and print adver-
tisements as well as school-based workshops.178 The educational 
campaigns have varied in tone and focus; some show innocent child-
ren exposed to methamphetamine production by parents or neigh-
bors; some show ravaged producers frantically cooking metham-
phetamine; most focus on the potentially debilitating physical and 
oral health consequences of repeated methamphetamine use.179 One 
                                                                                                                               
 174. See id.
 175. The question of whether our ambivalent policy response to methamphetamine re-
flects factors unique to methamphetamine or signals a more general softening of American 
drug policy is treated extensively infra Part V.  
 176. See Miller, supra note 169, at 420 (noting creation of first modern drug court in 
1989); id. at 417 (“Perhaps the most important judicial response to the War on Drugs has 
been the creation of specialty ‘drug courts’ designed to ameliorate the impact of drug sen-
tencing policy on individual drug users.”). One incomplete list of drug court programs lists 
programs in 43 states. See National Center for State Courts, Specialty Courts:  Drug 
Courts: Drug Courts, Drug Indicators, and Drug Court Programs: State Links, http:// 
www.ncsconline.org/wc/CourTopics/StateLinks.asp?id=24&topic=DrugCt (last visited Aug. 
27, 2010). 
 177. Moreover, there are reasons to question whether diversion into a specialized drug 
court program is an unmitigated benefit for a criminal defendant. I explore these issues in 
a work in progress entitled “Thinking Outside the Cell: Criminal Justice Policy in a Post-
Mass Incarceration World.” See also Miller, supra note 169 (criticizing aspects of contem-
porary drug courts as well). 
 178. One of the most aggressive state-level programs has been the Montana Meth 
Project. For coverage of the Project and its advertising campaign, see, for example, Thomas 
W. Seibel & Steven A. Mange, The Montana Meth Project: “Unselling” a Dangerous Drug,
20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 405 (2009); Kate Zernike, With Scenes of Blood and Pain, Ads 
Battle Methamphetamine in Montana, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006. The Project’s website, 
which includes many of the pictures and other material it uses to attempt to influence 
teens not to try meth, is available at http://www.montanameth.org/.  
 179. See, e.g., Joh, supra note 10, at 182; Suo, supra note 109, at C7; Zernike, supra
note 178. For one media expert’s compilation of the forty most effective anti-meth ads (in-
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common tactic of such campaigns is to offer “before” and “after” pho-
tographs of meth users.180
 Other advertisements specifically target people already using me-
thamphetamine. Here, the language and the imagery are less cata-
strophic; the pathos is laced with hope. In September of 2008, for ex-
ample, the Office of National Drug Control Policy submitted an ad-
vertisement entitled “Rebuild After Meth.” Under a photograph of a 
smiling woman and child, the advertisement trumpets rising treat-
ment and falling usage numbers and focuses on a story to be asso-
ciated with the photograph: 
Consider Teresa. She is a mother, Girl Scout volunteer, and website 
developer. Her life took a sharp turn when she started using meth to 
lose weight. Her story went from bad to worse as she abandoned her 
family, including her 4-year-old daughter, for nearly a year in the 
search for her next high. She eventually entered a treatment pro-
gram and made a commitment to conquer her addiction. Today, she 
is drug-free and a leader in anti-meth efforts in her community. 
There are thousands of people like Teresa out there, showing indi-
viduals and communities what they need to know.181
IV.   MAKE NEW DRUG LAWS, BUT KEEP THE OLD
 Missing among these various legislative responses to metham-
phetamine is a dramatic increase in penalties for possession, manu-
facture, trafficking, and sale. Some legislatures have indeed in-
creased penalties for various methamphetamine offenses in the same 
way that we saw penalties increase for crack cocaine in the late 
1980s,182 but, as discussed above, most legislatures have focused  
more on prevention, education, and treatment than on increased in-
carceration.183 Nevertheless, there are some familiar themes in the 
response to methamphetamine by legislatures, courts, and law en-
forcement officials. In particular, courts have used methampheta-
                                                                                                                               
cluding both still images and videos), see 40+ Most Powerful Anti-Meth Advertisements, 
http://elitebydesign.com/anti-meth-ads/ (last visited Aug. 27, 2010). 
 180. The source for most such photographs is the “Faces of Meth” program adminis-
tered by the Multnomah (Portland), Oregon County Sheriff’s Department. The photo-
graphs, which originally gained prominence as accompaniments to the hyperbolic metham-
phetamine stories THE OREGONIAN ran in 2004 and 2005, are most easily accessed through 
the Partnership for a Drug Free America’s website at http://www.drugfree.org/ 
Portal/DrugIssue/MethResources/faces/index.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2010); see also Lisa 
Demer, Meth Ills Expand in Alaska, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005 (noting that 
the United States Attorney’s office in Alaska distributes before-and-after photos of me-
thamphetamine users from the same series). 
 181. OFFICE OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POL’Y, REBUILD AFTER METH (undated), available 
at http://www.theantidrug.com/openletter/Meth-Rebuild.pdf. 
 182. See, e.g., Act of May 21, 2004, ch. 845, §§2-3, 2004 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1922, 1923 (co-
dified at TENN. CODE. ANN. §39-17-417 (Supp. 2005)) (lowering the triggering quantity of 
methamphetamine for certain sentences from 100 and 1000 grams to 26 and 300 grams). 
 183. See supra Part III.B. 
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mine cases to carve out exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections, 
and legislatures and prosecutors have sought to protect fetuses and 
children from the effects of parental drug use, production, and sale. 
A.   Familiar Fourth Amendment Developments 
 A familiar narrative of drugs and the Fourth Amendment de-
scribes the expansion of exceptions to Fourth Amendment limitations 
on searches and seizures due to the perceived need to police the use, 
manufacture, and sale of drugs.184 Based on the nature of drugs 
themselves—portable, fungible, and easy to conceal—courts have 
gifted law enforcement officers with the ability to search more intru-
sively and thoroughly than prior doctrine might have suggested.185
Courts have used the ease of illicit drug disposal, as well as the vi-
olence associated with drug sales, to support findings of exigent cir-
cumstances that permit officers to dispense with obtaining warrants 
and, when they do obtain warrants, knocking and announcing their 
presence when serving warrants they do obtain.186
 The volatility of the chemicals used to produce methamphetamine 
has similarly provided a foundation for permitting officers to search 
without obtaining warrants. Officers generally establish probable 
cause in suspected methamphetamine lab cases by identifying by 
smell chemicals associated with methamphetamine production187 or 
                                                                                                                               
 184. See, e.g., Glasser & Siegel, supra note 67, at 243. Graham Boyd, Director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union’s Drug Policy Litigation Project, argues that “the court cas-
es that have most destroyed the Bill of Rights, methodically abridging freedom of religion, 
freedom of speech, freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and property rights, 
have all concerned drugs.” Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 VILL.
L. REV. 839, 840 (2002). In the context of the Fourth Amendment, Boyd argues that the ex-
pansion of exceptions based on the War on Drugs is inevitable, as drug offenses lack com-
plaining witnesses, meaning that police need to rely on informants, wiretapping, undercov-
er operations, wiretapping, and other practices that implicate the Fourth Amendment. Id.
at 842. 
 185. A 2002 Villanova Law Review symposium provided some of the nation’s leading 
critics of current Fourth Amendment doctrine with an opportunity to explore the connec-
tions between drug policy and the decline of Fourth Amendment protections. For some of 
the most powerful critiques, see Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: 
A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851 
(2002); Kevin R. Johnson, U.S. Border Enforcement: Drugs, Migrants, and the Rule of Law,
47 VILL. L. REV. 897 (2002); Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753 (2002); 
David A. Moran, The New Fourth Amendment Vehicle Doctrine: Stop and Search Any Car 
at Any Time, 47 VILL. L. REV. 815 (2002). See also Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of 
War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389 (1993); David Ru-
dovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and Racial Equality, 1994 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237; Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging “Drug Exception” to the 
Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987). 
 186. On the various justifications offered for loosening Fourth Amendment protections 
in the drug context, see Luna, supra note 185, at 765-77. 
 187. A long line of recent Eighth Circuit cases find that both probable cause and ex-
igent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry are established based on the smell of 
methamphetamine manufacture and little or nothing else. See, e.g., United States v. 
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by observing equipment and materials associated with methamphe-
tamine manufacture.188 Courts reason that, where an officer has 
probable cause to believe that an operational methamphetamine la-
boratory exists in a location, exigent circumstances permit the officer 
warrantless entry in order to protect residents, neighbors, and the of-
ficers themselves from the possibility that the methamphetamine lab 
might at any moment explode.189
 Finally, as methamphetamine manufacturers have experimented 
with work-around strategies to avoid restrictions on pseudoephedrine 
purchases, courts have held that purchasing patterns can also pro-
vide reasonable suspicion to detain suspected producers.190 Shopping 
companions who separately purchase pseudoephedrine may provide 
reasonable suspicion to support a stop.191 Purchasing the maximum 
permitted amount of pseudoephedrine at several stores in succession 
may also provide reasonable suspicion to effectuate a stop.192 As dis-
cussed above, a store clerk or operator who permits a person to make 
such purchases, aside from breaking precursor sales restrictions 
laws, may be providing investigating officers with reasonable suspi-
                                                                                                                               
Clarke, 564 F.3d 949, 959 (8th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d 729, 734 (8th 
Cir. 2002). 
 188. See, e.g., United States v. Rhiger, 315 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2003).    
 189. See, e.g., United States v. Clarke, 564 F.3d at 959; Williams v. State, 995 So. 2d 
915, 920-221 (Ala. Crim. App. 2008); State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 273 (Iowa 2006); 
United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d at 734; United States v. Wilson, 865 F.2d 215, 217 (9th 
Cir. 1989). In Williams, the officers offered memorable testimony explaining their reasons 
for proceeding without a warrant. 995 So. 2d at 917 (reporting that officers testified “we’ve 
been almost blew up in meth labs before”). But see State v. Moore, 183 P.3d 158, 161-162 
(N.M. Ct. App. 2008)  (affirming district court’s finding that exigent circumstances did not 
justify officer’s warrantless entry into home; while an operational methamphetamine la-
boratory might provide an exigent circumstance supporting warrantless entry, the police 
did not “have knowledge of specific, articulable facts that demonstrate that immediate ac-
tion is necessary”). 
 190. See generally Andrew C. Goetz, Note, One Stop, No Stop, Two Stop, Terry Stop: 
Reasonable Suspicion and Pseudoephedrine Purchases by Suspected Methamphetamine 
Manufacturers, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1573 (2007). 
 191. See, e.g., United States v. Ameling, 328 F.3d 443, 448 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding a 
finding of reasonable suspicion where two customers picked up pseudoephedrine products 
together, purchased them from separate cashiers, consolidated the purchases in the park-
ing lot, and had also purchased a lithium battery that might be used in methamphetamine 
manufacture); State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157 (Iowa 2003) (finding police had sufficient 
suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle when the defendant and a woman entered a Target 
store together but then separated and bought several boxes of cold medication containing 
pseudoephedrine at separate cash registers, before driving to a Walmart). But see State v. 
Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. 2004) (finding, on similar facts, that police lacked reason-
able suspicion to conduct a Terry stop).   
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Thurston, No. S1-4.02 CR 494 CDP DDN, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 14954, at *8-10 (E.D. Mo. May 14, 2003) (finding that police had reasonable 
suspicion to perform a Terry stop where customer purchased two boxes of pseudoephedrine 
products at a Target, proceeded to a Walgreens, and purchased two additional boxes of 
pseudoephedrine). 
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cion or probable cause to believe that they are conspiring with or are 
an accessory to the manufacture of methamphetamine.193
B.   “But What About the Children?” 
 A second similarity in the criminal sanctions response to me-
thamphetamine has been the focus on the effects of exposure to drug 
activity on children and the attempts of legislatures, courts, and 
prosecutors to devise ways in which criminal sanctions might curtail 
the effects of drug manufacture and use on minors. The exposure of 
children to methamphetamine itself can support an exigent circums-
tances exception to the warrant requirement.194
 While the legislative response to methamphetamine generally has 
not included radically increased sanctions for offenses or wholesale 
creation of new crimes, one of the exceptions to this observation is in 
the area of child protection. Legislatures have appended methamphe-
tamine exposure to existing child abuse and neglect offenses or 
created new “child abuse by methamphetamine exposure” statutes;195
created special felonies criminalizing the manufacture of metham-
phetamine in the presence of a child or dependant adult;196 and in-
creased penalties for existing methamphetamine offenses when 
children are present or involved.197 In states with more general child 
                                                                                                                               
 193. See, e.g., supra note 126 (discussing one such incident). 
 194. See, e.g., Richards v. State, 659 S.E.2d 651, 653 (Ga. App. 2008) (holding that the 
smell of chemicals normally associated with methamphetamine manufacturing and a 
glimpse of what looks like a meth lab were sufficient to create an exigent circumstance 
when there was reason to believe that a child was present); State v. Crabb, 835 N.E.2d 
1068, 1071 (Ind. App. 2005) (holding that the smell of ether and the rustling of curtains, 
“combined with credible evidence that a small child was on the premises and, thus, being 
exposed to both risks from explosions due to the flammability of the chemicals used in 
producing methamphetamine and from the effects that ether can have on the respiratory 
system,” provided officers with sufficient exigent circumstances to permit officers to make 
warrantless entry).  
 195. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.42.100 (Supp. 2007) (“A person is guilty of the 
crime of endangerment with a controlled substance if the person knowingly or intentionally 
permits a dependent child or dependent adult to be exposed to, ingest, inhale, or have con-
tact with methamphetamine or ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or anhydrous ammonia, in-
cluding their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers, that are being used in the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers. Endangerment with a 
controlled substance is a class B felony.”). Michigan, Iowa, and South Dakota have also 
enacted specific “child abuse by methamphetamine” statutes. See Feature: Methampheta-
mine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, but Do They Help or Hurt?, DRUG WAR CHRON., 
July 14, 2006, available at http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/444/drug-child-abuse-laws. 
 196. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-22.2 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-
102(23)(D) (2006). Georgia, Idaho, and Ohio are among the other states that have specific 
felonies criminalizing the manufacture of methamphetamine in the presence of a child. See 
Feature: Methamphetamine as Child Abuse Laws Gain Ground, but Do They Help or Hurt?,
supra note 195. 
 197. For example, Washington provides a sentencing enhancement for methampheta-
mine manufacture where methamphetamine was produced in the presence of a child. See 
WASH. REV. CODE §9.94A.827(2) (Supp. 2009). 
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abuse statutes, courts have likewise expanded criminal liability, 
upholding convictions for child abuse for exposing children to me-
thamphetamine manufacturing, even in the absence of proof of harm 
to the child.198
 As we saw with maternal use of crack cocaine,199 prosecutors have 
sought to use existing child abuse statutes to sanction women who 
use methamphetamine during pregnancy.200 As we also saw with re-
spect to crack cocaine,201 courts generally have not permitted such 
tactics.202 In one high-profile case, local prosecutors in Hawaii 
brought manslaughter charges against a woman whose two-day-old 
baby died after she smoked methamphetamine in the days leading up 
to its birth.203 She entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the 
right to contest the charges, and was vindicated when the Hawaii 
Supreme Court rejected the prosecutor’s interpretation of the statute 
                                                                                                                               
 The extent to which laws of these various types have been or will be effective in li-
miting the exposure of children to hazardous conditions has not been studied. The number 
of children endangered by methamphetamine manufacture, or who enter state child protec-
tive service programs because of methamphetamine exposure, is unclear; state depart-
ments do not keep statistics, and informal estimates range from half of child abuse cases to 
less than one percent. Statutes might protect children from toxic exposure by providing 
parents with a manufacturing disincentive or by making unavailable via imprisonment 
parents who produce methamphetamine; they might, on the other hand, drive parents who 
produce methamphetamine into greater secrecy, or place children who live in environmen-
tally toxic environments in possibly unsafe foster care environments. 
 198. See, e.g., People v. Toney, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 578, 581 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
child abuse conviction when child was found in location where chemicals for the manufac-
turing of methamphetamine were found without requiring proof that methamphetamine 
was actually manufactured there). 
 199. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text. For a recent article decrying the 
trend of prosecuting mothers for harms allegedly inflicted on their fetuses, see generally 
Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis of Inade-
quate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537 (2006). 
 200. One difference between this wave of prosecutions and those relating to crack co-
caine is that this time the community of criminal defense attorneys, public health officials, 
and advocates for pregnant women were ready with a concerted legal and scientific re-
sponse. See generally Meth and Myth: Top Doctors, Scientists and Specialists Warn Mass 
Media on “Meth Baby” Stories, July 29, 2005, http://stopthedrugwar.org/ 
chronicle/397/methandmyth.shtml (gathering medical evidence problematizing link be-
tween meth use and fetal health); KING, supra note 10, at 16 (criticizing media’s handling 
of scientific and medical data relating to methamphetamine); see also PROVINE, supra note 
10, at 165 (noting that media and politicians were much more skeptical about “meth baby” 
claims than they had been about “crack baby” stories). 
 201. See discussion supra note 68. In this context, it is worth noting that the most high-
profile homicide conviction against a pregnant woman who used crack cocaine was set 
aside on state post-conviction review in 2008, on the grounds that her lawyers were ineffec-
tive in failing to present sufficient expert testimony and to fully “investigate medical evi-
dence contradicting the State’s experts’ testimony on the link between cocaine and still-
birth.” McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d  354, 354 (S.C. 2008). 
 202. See, e.g., cases discussed infra notes 203-05 and accompanying text. See also Amos 
Bridges, Charge Filed after Baby Born with Meth Traces, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Dec. 
29, 2005, available at http://www.csdp.org/news/news/news_mometh_122905.htm (describing 
filing of child abuse charges against 19-year-old Missouri woman whose child was born with 
traces amounts of methamphetamine in its system). 
 203. See State v. Aiwohi, 123 P.3d 1210, 1210-11 (Haw. 2008) (narrating events). 
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and reversed her conviction.204 In another heavily followed case, a 
judge dismissed child endangerment charges brought against a 
Wyoming woman after her newborn child tested positive for me-
thamphetamine.205 In one Oklahoma case, a woman spent two years 
in prison awaiting a trial on homicide charges stemming from the 
stillbirth of a child born after she ingested methamphetamine during 
the late stages of pregnancy, pled guilty to second-degree murder and 
received an ostensible fifteen-year sentence, but was released a year 
later after completing drug rehabilitation as part of an informal deal 
with the prosecutor and the trial judge.206
V.   WHY IS THIS PANIC DIFFERENT FROM ALL OTHER PANICS?
 If we are in the midst of a methamphetamine panic, it is a panic 
that has produced a comparatively temperate result. Why has public 
and legislative concern about a drug described in terms of natural 
disasters and communicable deadly disease generated cold medica-
tion restrictions and educational programs rather than extensive new 
criminal law?   
A.   Some Preliminary Theories 
1.   Race 
 The narrative provided by scholars of the crack cocaine legislative 
response, as detailed above,207 is largely one of racial panic. Crack co-
caine is and was associated with African-American users and sellers, 
goes the analysis, and this association facilitated draconian criminal 
sanctions and mass imprisonment.208 The “War on Drugs” has largely 
been a war on people of color, waged against people citizens and leg-
                                                                                                                               
 204. Id. at 1224-25. 
 205. See Judge Drops ‘Meth Baby’ Charge, CASPER STAR-TRIB., Sept. 29, 2005, available at
http://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/article_e76def07-3088-527f-8a9a-18f5f05ea9a6.html (de-
tailing case).  
 206. See Dana Stone, Is Meth Murder Charge Useful?, OKLAHOMAN, Dec. 19, 2007 (nar-
rating story of Theresa Hernandez who spent two years in jail awaiting trial on first-degree 
murder charges before pleading guilty to second-degree murder and receiving a fifteen-year 
sentence); Jay F. Marks, Woman Was Charged in Her Stillborn Son’s Death — Meth Mom 
Wins Early Release, OKLAHOMAN, Nov. 20, 2008, at 1A (narrating later developments, in-
cluding her release). 
 Creative prosecution strategies have, of course, not been limited to cases involving 
pregnant and parenting women. Prosecutors in North Carolina, for example, have charged 
persons who operate methamphetamine labs under the state’s antiterrorism “weapons of 
mass destruction” statute. O. Dean Sanderford, Terrorism Statutes Run Wild:  Methamphe-
tamine and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 82 N.C. L. REV 2142, 2142 (2004). See also Jaime 
Holguin, Terror Laws Used vs. Common Crimes:  Critics Bothered by String of Increasing 
Cases, CBS NEWS, Sept. 14, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
stories/2003/09/14/national/main573155.shtml (noting that a North Carolina man charged 
under this law faced twelve years to life in prison). 
 207. See supra Part III.B. 
 208. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text. 
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islators already fear.209 It is easier to embrace mass incarceration 
when you do not identify with the persons incarcerated and to the ex-
tent that you do think of them, it is with trepidation. Whether or not 
legislators and citizens consciously wish to harm people based on 
race, racial unease, antipathy, and panic facilitate the decisions to 
prosecute and punish.210
 This narrative is appealing as applied to methamphetamine. 
While crack cocaine in particular has been associated with African 
Americans, and other illicit drugs have historically been linked to 
disfavored subgroups, methamphetamine is, accurately, characte-
rized as a drug that is preferred by white populations.211 As white 
Americans do not comprise a disfavored racial group, and as there 
are no characteristics associated with methamphetamine users (such 
as radical politics or generalized social dissent)212 that might other-
wise corral them into such a targeted subgroup, we would not expect 
to see the sorts of dramatic legislative responses that we have seen in 
the past. Unlike Chinese immigrants smoking opium, or Mexican 
immigrants smoking marijuana, methamphetamine use does not 
stoke racial anxieties. 
 Media articles and legislative history provide some support for 
this argument. The portrayal of methamphetamine addicts in the 
popular press often has often been one of pity and sympathy.213 Leg-
                                                                                                                               
 209. Kennedy, supra note 20 at 1258.  
 210. See supra note 208.
 211. Methamphetamine prosecutions have been credited with “whitening” to some ex-
tent the federal prison population; in 1994, for example, about 73% of new federal inmates 
convicted of methamphetamine offenses were white. See Schone, supra note 129, at 35. By 
2005, the data was more ambiguous; while the plurality of those newly convicted of federal 
meth offenses remained white, the number was not less than fifty percent. See Motivans, 
supra note 116, at 2. While the characterization of methamphetamine as a “white drug” 
has been fairly consistent, it has not proven universal. For example, some sources have 
linked methamphetamine use with the Native American population. See, e.g., Andrew 
Murr & Sarah Childress, A New Menace on the Rez, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 27, 2004, at 30 (of-
fering a story about methamphetamine use on Native American reservations and quoting a 
Bureau of Indian Affairs official as arguing that  “[m]eth is becoming the drug of choice in 
Indian Country”).  
 212. Cf. supra Part II.A.3 (discussing mainstream culture’s unease about social groups 
associated with drug use during the 1960s). 
 213. See, e.g., Joel Baird, Crazy about METH, DAILEY NEWS LEADER, Sept. 11, 2005 (on 
file with author) (profiling methamphetamine user whose methamphetamine use had led 
to the dissolution of his marriage and scars from picking his skin; the user described me-
thamphetamine users as “everyday people,” “good people, educated people, uneducated 
people; white collar, blue collar; people who drive BMWs, people who drive grandma’s car 
that barely runs; housewives who’ve got two kids at home and are tired of washing 
clothes”); Melanie Bennett & Chuck Williams, Meth’s Human and Economic Costs are 
Enormous, COLUMBUS LEDGER-ENQUIRER, Oct. 26, 2005, available at  2005 WLNR 
17275992 (describing a man whose methamphetamine use, according to him, led to losing 
his land, houses, wife, children, savings, business, vehicles, and ultimately, liberty). David 
Sheff, My Son the Addict, OBSERVER, Oct. 23, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 17193468 
(describing the author’s son, an upper-middle-class University of California at Berkeley 
addict who struggled with methamphetamine addiction before successfully completing a 
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islators tell stories about relatives and community members whose 
lives have been savaged by methamphetamine use.214 The public and 
political discourse about methamphetamine shows a degree of empa-
thy for drug users that far exceeds anything seen in recent drug pan-
ics. The narrative that the racial status of persons associated with 
the use of methamphetamine—that of the white majority—has dri-
ven policy responses is thus an appealing one. 
 This explanation does not, however, seem fully persuasive. In re-
cent years, it is not just methamphetamine legislation and executive 
action that has been characterized by relative restraint, but other 
                                                                                                                               
rehabilitation program and obtaining a job writing for an online magazine); Zernike, supra
note 178 (describing Montana Meth Project’s anti-methamphetamine advertising campaign 
featuring televised images of a fictional teenager’s blood swirling in her shower drain from 
the cuts she has made while picking her skin during methamphetamine, and radio com-
mercials using actual recovering methamphetamine addicts detailing prostituting them-
selves for methamphetamine and losing their homes and jobs). 
Newsweek profiled a police chief arrested for conspiring to produce methampheta-
mine and cited a scientist who studies methamphetamine as describing “high achievers” 
such as college students and law enforcement officials as one of the fastest-growing groups 
of methamphetamine users. See Sarah Childress, Crystal Handcuffs:  Battling the Meth 
Scourge, a Police Chief is Charged, NEWSWEEK, May 16, 2005, at 36. 
 Newsweek’s controversial methamphetamine cover story, America’s Most Dangerous 
Drug, tells the story of one woman in particular:
The leafy Chicago suburb of Burr Ridge is the kind of place where people come to 
live the American dream in million-dollar homes on one-acre lots. Eight years ago 
Kimberly Fields and her husband, Todd, bought a ranch house here on a wooded 
lot beside a small lake, and before long they were parents, with two sons, a black 
Labrador and a Volvo in the drive. But somewhere along the way this blond 
mother with a college degree and a $100,000-a-year job as a sales rep for Apria 
Healthcare found something that mattered more: methamphetamine. 
Jefferson et al., supra note 101, at 41. After turning to methamphetamine, Kimberly was 
arrested three times for shoplifting, and:  
[B]y the time cops came banging on her door with a search warrant . . . Kimber-
ly, now 37, had turned her slice of suburbia into a meth lab . . . . Dressed in a 
pink T shirt printed with the words ALL STRESSED OUT, Kimberly looked 
about 45 pounds thinner than when police first booked her for shoplifting two 
years ago. Her leg bore a knee-to-ankle scar from a chemical burn, and police 
found anhydrous ammonia, also used in cooking meth, buried in a converted 
propane tank in her backyard. As officers led Kimberly away in handcuffs, her 
6-year-old son Nicholas was “only concerned that his brother had his toys and 
diapers,” recalls Detective Mike Barnes. Meanwhile, police evacuated 96 near-
by homes, fearing the alleged meth lab might explode. 
Id.
 Mom-and-pop local methamphetamine producers similarly are described in terms 
that suggest something other than organized criminal enterprise. As a district attorney in 
Georgia told a local newspaper, “I would not classify these as mom-and-pop operations.  I 
would classify them as idiot operations. These are people who couldn’t pass high school 
chemistry.” Chuck Williams & Melanie Bennett, ‘Cocaine Times 10,’ COLUMBUS LEDGER-
ENQUIRER, Oct. 21, 2005, at A1 (quoting Lee County District Attorney Nick Abbott); see al-
so Schone, supra note 129, at 35 (describing mom-and-pop methamphetamine manufactur-
ers as “the plague of Beavis and Butt-Head”). 
 214. Cf. State Representative’s Son Faces Meth Charge, DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 2005. 
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skirmishes in the “War on Drugs.”215 Crack cocaine, in particular—
the drug which generated a rich literature detailing racialized drug 
policy—has enjoyed considerable reconsideration both in statute and 
in sentencing policy.216 If the one-way ratchet can turn in reverse for 
a drug so closely associated with African-American users, it seems 
unlikely that race, while perhaps a partial explanation for focus on 
precursor restrictions and treatment programs, provides a full expla-
nation. Ironically enough, the precursor restrictions may end up 
themselves testing the disfavored social group hypothesis: as precur-
sors have arguably made it more difficult for mom-and-pop manufac-
turers to produce methamphetamine in home laboratories, metham-
phetamine has increasingly been imported from super labs located in 
Mexico.217 If methamphetamine becomes associated less with white 
                                                                                                                               
 215. See supra note 15; infra Part IV.B. 
 216. See, e.g., Emery, supra note 15 (detailing progress towards repealing crack-cocaine 
powder sentencing disparity and predicting that “this may be the year” that the disparity is 
eliminated and crack sentences are reduced); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) 
(allowing judges discretion to sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser 
terms based on judges’ personal disapproval of crack/powder disparity). 
 In an interesting and representative incident, when South Carolina recently decided to 
address disparities across penalties for powder and crack cocaine possession (a two-year max-
imum sentence for simple possession of powder cocaine, in contrast to a five-year maximum 
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine), it did so not by doing what might twenty 
years ago have been predicted (simply raise the maximum penalty for possession of powder 
cocaine to five years, as drug sentences can only increase), but by lowering the maximum pe-
nalty for crack cocaine and raising the maximum penalty for powder cocaine so that both car-
ried a possible three years. See 2005-2006 Bill 16: Include Manufacturing Methamphetamine 
as a Violent Crime, S.C. Gen. Assem. http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sess116_2005-2006/ 
bills/16.htm (last updated Dec. 4, 2009) (providing text of Bill and noting its passage). 
 217. See, e.g., Bennett &  Williams, supra note 213, at A1 (reporting on drug sting involv-
ing methamphetamine officers believed had been trafficked from Mexico); Sara Jean Green, 
U.S. Meth Roundup Snares 24 in Western Washington; 427 arrested in all – Increased Smug-
gling from Mexico, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 31, 2005 at B1 (quoting King County Sherriff Su 
Rahr as saying “as we’ve shut down the labs, we’re seeing meth coming up and U.S. Attorney 
for the Western District of Washington John McKay saying his office has observed “some-
thing of a trend” with a “shift from home-cooked methamphetamine” to methamphetamine 
“produced in super-labs”); Ryckaert, supra note 142, at A04 (quoting White House Office of 
National Drug Control Policy director John P. Walters as saying that “Organized criminals 
now produce large quantities of methamphetamine in Mexico and are moving it across our 
borders”); Lloyd de Vries, CBS News, Mexican Meth Floods U.S., May 19, 2006, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/05/19/eveningnews/main1636846.shtml (reporting that, 
despite a decline in domestic methamphetamine production due to lab raids, “The epidemic of 
meth use is still rampant because the drug is still plentiful on America’s streets . . . . This 
deadly [methamphetamine] is now a growth industry for Mexico’s deadly drug cartels. 
They’re replacing small U.S. kitchen labs with Mexican super labs”); Greenwood Officials Ar-
rest More Suspects in Meth Ring Investigation, WIS-TV, Dec. 19, 2005, available at 
http://www.wistv.com/global/story.asp?s=4250657&ClientType=Printable (detailing workings 
of major ring importing methamphetamine into South Carolina from Mexico); Lisa Demer, 
Meth Ills Expand in Alaska, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005, at B1 (noting a shift 
from homegrown methamphetamine to methamphetamine imported from Mexico); 
ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005, at B3, available at 2005 WLNR 20102925 (quoting di-
rector of the Iowa governor’s Office of Drug Control Policy says that since methampheta-
mine precursor restrictions were put into place, “organized criminals” are “now producing 
large bulk quantities of methamphetamine in Mexico,” and arguing that “[w]e’re being 
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stateside producers and users and more with Mexican manufacturers 
and importers, we will see if or how the legal response to metham-
phetamine changes.
2.   Media Coverage 
 A second plausible explanation is that the language used to de-
scribe methamphetamine, methamphetamine addicts, and metham-
phetamine sellers/manufacturers, as employed by the media, legisla-
tors, and the public in general, differs in tone and content from the 
language that has surrounded past drug panics. Perhaps there simp-
ly isn’t a panic; writers, policymakers, and citizens are unperturbed 
by methamphetamine. While there are scattered pieces of evidence to 
support this claim,218 it ultimately fails to persuade.   
 It would be difficult to argue that the language surrounding me-
thamphetamine in the media is substantially different in terms of its 
emphatic and hyperbolic qualities than it has been during past per-
ceived epidemics of drug use. Articles about methamphetamine use 
“epidemic” and “plague” to describe the drug’s use.219 Natural-disaster 
language also has characterized the media response to methampheta-
mine; media sources have pressed the tidal wave disaster analogy into 
repeat service, echoing perhaps the language of law enforcement offic-
ers describing the perceived entrance of methamphetamine into or 
outbreak of methamphetamine use within a state.220 The tornado has 
also enjoyed employment as a metaphor for methamphetamine, used 
to describe the imminent approach of methamphetamine to areas 
where methamphetamine has not yet taken root.221
 According to media sources, methamphetamine is—as were the 
drugs that anchored past drug “epidemics”—the worst drug of all 
                                                                                                                               
killed with ‘Mexican ice,’” which he describes as substantially more pure than locally-
produced methamphetamine).   
 218. See generally supra note 213 (collecting articles that offer comparatively sympa-
thetic portrayals of methamphetamine users and producers). 
 219. See, e.g., Crane, supra note 101, at A24; Johnson, supra note 101, at 41. Politicians 
have also utilized this language. See, e.g., ABERDEEN AM. NEWS, supra note 217, at B3, 
(quoting Indiana Governor Mitch Daniels as saying that “we can trace [methampheta-
mine’s] path like a plague . . . . If we call this effort to eliminate this problem a war, for 
once, we’re not overstating it”). So, too, have academics. See, e.g., O’Connor et al., supra
note 123 (article entitled Developing Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Epidemics of Me-
thamphetamine Production and Use).  
 220. See, e.g., Jill Young Miler & Craig Schneider, When Meth Hits Home:  Meth’s For-
saken Children—When Parents Disappear into a Chaotic World of Drug Abuse, Danger and 
Heartbreak Follow for Their Sons and Daughters, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 30 2003, at A1 
(quoting Georgia Bureau of Investigation Director Vernon Keenan as describing metham-
phetamine as having entered his state “like a tidal wave”). 
 221. Lamothe, supra note 119, at A1 (discussing the possibility of crystal methamphe-
tamine becoming prevalent in Massachusetts).  
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time, more devastating and addictive than any other drug.222 Media 
sources often run “before and after” photos of users to illustrate the 
drug’s effects on individuals.223 Methamphetamine in fact has been 
described explicitly as “the new crack,”224 the latest drug to take the 
crown of most addictive and devastating. “It really has become the 
drug of choice. It’s taken over heroin and it’s taken over crack.”225
Media articles also have held methamphetamine responsible for the 
spread of sexually transmitted diseases. 226
 As we saw in the late 1980s with respect to crack cocaine, media 
sources have featured connections between methamphetamine use 
and external social effects. As noted above, media reports have high-
lighted the public health problems associated with methampheta-
mine production and extent to which methamphetamine producers 
endanger household members, children, and neighbors.227 In addition 
to describing these physical and environmental dangers, media 
sources have detailed criminal offenses in which methamphetamine 
addicts engage in order to provide funding for their habits. In par-
ticular, articles have focused on information theft (often referred to 
                                                                                                                               
 222. See, e.g., Jennifer Chambers, Police Offer Testing Kits as Meth Use Accelerates,
DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 15, 2005,  at 3B (quoting Oakland County Commissioner Eric Cole-
man, speaking on behalf of the National Association of Counties, as saying that metham-
phetamine “is bigger and worse than heroin or cocaine can ever be”); Nancy Lofholm, Ar-
rest Ends Meth-Ring Manhunt: Mesa County for Weeks has been Rattled by Violence Linked 
to the Drug’s Widespread Use, DENVER POST, Dec. 13, 2005, at A1 (describing a group of 
suspected methamphetamine addicts who “had held Mesa County in a jittery grip of fear 
and violence for weeks,” linked methamphetamine to local shootings, and quoting a local 
law enforcement officers as saying that methamphetamine “is public safety’s and the com-
munity’s worst nightmare” and that “[t]his drug is different . . . . What it does to people is 
so much worse than anything else out there”); Marcovitz, supra note 152, at B1 (quoting a 
local district attorney as saying that “meth is a killer. It destroys communities. It is not 
like any other drug”); Puzzanghera, supra note 128, at A1 (“Law enforcement officials say 
[methamphetamine] is the most devastating drug they have ever encountered, hooking 
most users the first time they try it.”); A Commission at Work: Public Safety Advisers Have 
Their Hands Full in Dealing with Crystal Meth, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Dec. 16, 
2005, at A16 (“[Methamphetamine] is far more addictive and far more dangerous stuff than 
cocaine, heroine, or other street drugs.”). 
 223. See sources cited supra note 180.  
 224. See, e.g., Bruce Ramsey, The Scourge of the New Crack, SEATTLE TIMES, June 14, 
2009, at H4 (reviewing REDING, supra note 10); Press Release, U.S. Senate, Schumer: New 
Stats Show Crystal Meth Quickly Becoming the New Crack—Seizures in New York Up 
31% Over Last Year, (Apr. 25, 2004), available at http://schumer.senate.gov/ 
new_website/record.cfm?id=265406 (“Crystal meth is becoming the new crack, and we need 
tough new penalties that treat it like crack.”). 
 225. Chambers, supra note 222, at 3 (quoting Police Chief William Dwyer of Farming-
ton Hills, Michigan).   
 226. See Patricia Guthrie, Drugs, Risky Sex Get Blame for Jump in Syphilis Cases,
Nov. 9, 2005, ATLANTA J. CONST., at A9 (reporting that the Center for Disease Control has 
seen a rise in syphilis cases among men who have sex with men, and suggests a link 
between methamphetamine use and risky sexual behavior leading to disease 
transmission); Jefferson et. al., supra note 105, at 38. 
 227. See, e.g., Kathleen Brady Shea, 8 Arrested in Methamphetamine Ring,
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Sept. 8, 2005, at B5.  
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as identity theft), a crime which even when uncoupled from metham-
phetamine generates a fair amount of panic, describing methamphe-
tamine addicts as stealing personal information in order to obtain 
money to buy drugs.228 In one newspaper article, a local sheriff esti-
mated that eighty five percent of information theft offenses he inves-
tigated were in fact committed by methamphetamine addicts.229 Ar-
ticles also have linked car thefts to methamphetamine, similarly por-
traying addicts as stealing cars to raise money for drugs.230 The list of 
devastating methamphetamine effects as outlined in media sources is 
lengthy, and the language used to describe its effects thus is emphat-
ic. While these stories may or may not be grounded in reality—
figures on crimes related to methamphetamine are not reliable231 and 
figures on the percentage of foster cases related to methamphetamine 
have proven unverifiable232—it is fairly unpersuasive to argue that to 
the extent media might drive police responses, that a change in tone 
in media articles is responsible.     
3.   Alternative Panics 
 Another explanation for the legal response to methamphetamine 
is that we are indeed panicking about crime—but primarily about 
other kinds of offenses, particularly sex offenses against children. 
During the last two decades, there has been a major expansion of leg-
islation increasing penalties for those who commit sexual offenses 
                                                                                                                               
 228. See, e.g., Greg Risling, Meth Users Turn to ID Theft to Pay for Habit, CONTRA 
COSTA TIMES, Dec. 18, 2005, at F4 (“[M]ore and more desperate users of [methampheta-
mine] are turning to identity theft to pay for their habit, creating a criminal nexus costing 
Americans millions of dollars.”). 
 229. See id.
 230. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, The Distinction Modesto Didn’t Need: National Car-
Theft Capital, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2006 (noting that Modesto, California leads the nation 
in car thefts per capita and largely blaming methamphetamine for that distinction); Ja-
nelle, supra note 217 (describing the investigation and arrest of thirty suspects in an al-
leged methamphetamine distribution ring and noting that the investigation revealed a ve-
hicular “theft ring, a chop shop for stolen cars,” and a counterfeiting scheme).  
 231. Efforts to evaluate extravagant claims of meth’s effects on crime rates have usually 
left the involved analysts skeptical. For one well-reported such effort, see Angela Valdez, 
Meth Madness: How The Oregonian Manufactured an Epidemic, Politicians Bought It and 
You’re Paying, WILLAMETTE WEEK, Mar. 22, 2006, available at http://www.wweek.com/ 
popup/print.php?index=7368 (analyzing fourteen stories in The Oregonian that, inter alia, de-
scribed the proportion of state property crimes “fuel[ed]” by methamphetamine as between 80 
and 90 percent and failing to find supporting data to verify the accuracy of this figure). 
 232. In August of 2005, The Oregonian ran a front-page story with the subheadline: “Ore-
gon’s Meth Epidemic Creates Thousands of ‘Orphans.’ ” See Joseph Rose, The Children of Meth 
OREGONIAN, Aug. 28, 2005 at A01. According to the story, a state Department of Human Servic-
es study found that half of the state’s foster cases involved children taken “from parents using or 
making the potent drug.” See id. There was no such study, and DHS does not track whether or 
not methamphetamine causes children to be removed from homes; rather, a DHS coordinator 
had compared a list of parents with a list of people who had received methamphetamine treat-
ment and found a 50% correlation. See Valdez, supra note 231. 
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against children233 and imposing onerous new collateral sanctions 
upon such individuals.234 A wide variety of academic commentators 
have analyzed the legislative history and cultural politics of these 
laws and concluded that they are both disproportionate and vindic-
tive, reflecting a predictable desire to take out our collective cultural 
anxieties on individuals who we can comfortably dismiss as “monstr-
ous.”235 According to some scholars, we are in the midst—or perhaps 
at the tail end—of a full-fledged “sex panic.”236
 While one panic does not rule out the possibility of another, it ar-
guably reduces the odds. After all, given the limits of human emotion 
and energy, our capacity for moral indignation is not inexhaustible. 
Moreover, the creation of cultural images of monstrous offenders who 
impose dramatic physical and psychological trauma on vulnerable 
children creates a very high standard for those whom might want to 
demonize methamphetamine users.237 Next to those who sexually 
                                                                                                                               
 233. In the most extreme example, a handful of states adopted laws authorizing the 
death penalty for certain child sexual offenses. In June 2008, a sharply divided Supreme 
Court found that such laws violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2646 (2008). 
 234. Here, the most notable development is the growth of sexual offender registration 
laws, often called “Megan’s Laws.” Since 1996, every State has had such a statute. See Co-
rey Rayburn Yung, One of These Laws Is Not Like the Others: Why the Federal Sex Offend-
er Registration and Notification Act Raises New Constitutional Questions,  46 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 369, 370 n.6 (2009). The Supreme Court upheld two such statutes against constitu-
tional challenges in 2003. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003); Conn. Dep’t Pub. 
Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003). More recently, we have begun to see an expansion of 
laws that limit the ability of convicted sex offenders to live in proximity to places where 
children congregate, often to the point that there are few or even no places where they can 
legally reside. For one academic analysis of this trend, see generally Wayne A. Logan, Con-
stitutional Collectivism and Ex-Offender Residence Exclusion Laws, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1 
(2006).   
 235. See generally, e.g., Daniel M. Filler, Making the Case for Megan’s Law: A Study in 
Legislative Rhetoric, 76 IND. L.J. 315 (2001); Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and 
the Search for Solidarity Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000); Jona-
than Simon, Managing the Monstrous: Sex Offenders and the New Penology, 4 PSYCHOL,
PUB., POL’Y & L. 452 (1998). 
 236. For descriptions of the recent decades as an era of “sex panic” or “sex crimes pan-
ic,” see, for example, James E. Bristol III, Free Expression in Motion Pictures:  Childhood 
Sexuality and a Satisfied Society, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 333, 352 (2007) (describing 
“sex panic”); Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 
274 (2006) (describing “sex crimes ‘panic’ ”); Lisa Duggan, Sex Panics, in SEX WARS:
SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL CULTURE 74 (Lisa Duggan & Nan D. Hunter eds., 1995) 
(describing “sex panic”). The term “sex panic” is at times used to refer to our heightened 
and exaggerated concerns over sex crimes but is more often used to refer to a more general 
cultural anxiety about sexual behavior that manifests itself not only in sex crimes legisla-
tion but also in laws relating to pornography, obscenity, and gender relations. Used in the 
latter sense, the term is more often used with reference to the 1990s than to the most re-
cent years. Id.
 237. If, as posited here, the relevant distinction is between those who threaten others—
particularly the vulnerable and most especially children—and those whose behavior mostly 
damages themselves, then the shape of methamphetamine legislation described above 
makes sense. As discussed in Part II supra, much of the state legislation in response to me-
thamphetamine has been designed to prevent young people from becoming addicted or to 
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traumatize children, scraggly, frantic meth users might well appear 
more pathetic than dangerous.238
 Efforts to import restrictions developed in the sex-offender context 
to the meth content have gained little traction. Though some were in-
itially excited by the idea of methamphetamine registries,239 for ex-
ample, few states have adopted them240 and those that have adopted 
them provide less information about those convicted of methamphe-
tamine offenses than upon those convicted of even the most minor 
sex offenses.241 With regard to sexual offense registries, there has 
been near constant political pressure for more—more states partici-
pating, more offenses included, more information provided, more 
access for the public, and more restrictions on where persons con-
victed of sex offenses can reside, work, and socialize. In contrast, 
meth registries, as they have developed in the few states that main-
tain them, are limited tools; lacking photographs or extensive search 
features, they serve as little more than free, limited background 
checks for potential landlords, employers, and home buyers.  
4.   Personal Responsibility as Political Focus 
 The idea of being responsible for one’s own person, decisions, and 
fate is hardly novel.242 The mobilization of this concept politically, 
                                                                                                                               
protect third parties from explosions and other environmental harms resulting from drug 
manufacturing. As discussed in Part III.B supra, situations in which children are harmed 
or threatened is the one area in which legislators have been quick to add new criminal laws 
and penalties related to methamphetamine. 
 238. For characterizations of methamphetamine users that emphasize their pathetic 
plight, see supra note 213 and sources cited therein. 
 239. Representative Mike Coan, who introduced legislation to create a methampheta-
mine offender registry in Georgia, argued that “[t]he registry is necessary because the pro-
duction, distribution and use of this powerful street drug is the source of so much crime, 
ranging from robbery, theft, forgery, child abuse and neglect to a host of violent offenses.” 
Mike Coan, My View: Registry for Meth Offenders Would Protect Residents—Metro Atlanta 
Area a Major Hub for Trafficking, ATLANTA J. CONST., Feb. 12, 2006 at JJ4. He focused 
specifically on the effects of methamphetamine offenses on children, writing that “[j]ust as 
sex offenders do irreparable harm to children, meth abusers also harm innocent children. 
The addiction to this street drug is so powerful that addicts neglect their families, spend all 
their wages buying meth and behave extremely erratically, sometimes abusing children 
and spouses.” Id. With a methamphetamine registry, “neighbors can watch for suspicious 
activities,” arguing that “[i]nformation is power, and when residents have the ability to 
find out who lives in their community—whether it is a sex offender or a meth offender—
they can make better decisions about how they live their lives.” Id. Comparing persons 
convicted of sex crimes to persons convicted of methamphetamine offenses, “we must now 
take the same steps to ‘out’ offenders who bring this dangerous drug into our communi-
ties.” Id.
 240. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 146-148 and accompanying text. 
 242. See generally Michael B. Brennan, Essay, The Lodestar of Personal Responsibility,
88 MARQ. L. REV. 365 (2004) (discussing historical roots of “personal responsibility” as phi-
losophy and observing how the principle is applied in law). 
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however, has gained significant traction in recent years.243 This sort 
of libertarian impulse perhaps explains some of the legal develop-
ments we have seen with respect to methamphetamine. The changes 
that legislatures have made that increase criminal penalties for me-
thamphetamine offenses generally focus on protecting “innocent” 
persons who have not made bad decisions and who are not in a posi-
tion to protect themselves.244 This may explain why legislatures have 
enacted lengthier sentences primarily where persons associated with 
methamphetamine expose others to the dangers of their activities: 
nonmethamphetamine producers do not make intrinsically bad deci-
sions by having next-door neighbors or purchasing homes, and child-
ren are not making poor decisions when they are raised by metham-
phetamine producers. The language of self-sufficiency and personal 
responsibility in fact can be found directly in press releases support-
ing these legislative changes.245 This focus may explain why, even if 
reducing domestic production were to do little to reduce addiction, 
curtailing the number of mom-and-pop methamphetamine labs would 
comprise success: shutting down local methamphetamine labs, even 
if it does nothing to stem the influx of methamphetamine into com-
munities or the use of methamphetamine by addicts, will be help pro-
tect innocents from explosions and toxic chemicals.246
 This explanation, like others, cannot be fully explanatory: legisla-
tures are not ignoring the plight of addicts, but rather are allocating 
significant funding to educate potential users about the dangers of 
methamphetamine and to rehabilitate users through drug courts, 
methamphetamine prisons, and other treatment programs.247 Still, to 
the extent that the way in which we have been recognizing and deal-
ing with “serious” social problems has been by ratcheting up criminal 
penalties, it is possible to view recent legislative responses to me-
                                                                                                                               
 243. For example, the controversial 1996 law that, depending on your perspective, ei-
ther reformed or eliminated welfare was entitled the “Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.” See Pub. L. No.104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. 1305).In 1999, then-Senator John D. Ashcroft similarly lauded Clarence Thomas 
for the extent to which he promotes in his public life notions of personal responsibility. 
John D. Ashcroft, Justice Clarence Thomas: Reviving Restraint and Personal Responsibili-
ty, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 313, 315 (1999). 
 244. See generally Parts III.B and IV supra (exploring areas in which legislatures have 
chosen to focus their energies in regulating methamphetamine, including prevention, envi-
ronmental remediation, and child protection). 
 245. In explaining his support of legislation to provide grant money to states to estab-
lish programs to assist methamphetamine-exposed children, for example, Representative 
Zach Wamp argued that the legislation would give the children “the helping hand they 
need to begin climbing the ladder of life and have an opportunity at the American dream of 
self-sufficiency.” Meth-Endangered Children to Benefit from New Grant Program, supra
note 161.
 246. An assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Missouri 
commented, “Let the Mexicans have the meth trade. . . . We’ll have done a great thing if we 
take pseudoephedrine out of the game.” Schone, supra note 129, at 36. 
 247. See supra Parts III.B(5)-(6). 
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thamphetamine as signaling that while the government will still be 
heavily punitive if that is necessary to protect innocent citizens, non-
innocents who themselves ingest methamphetamine or are exposed 
to the hazards of their own methamphetamine production can be left 
to deal with the consequences of their own choices.
5.   Privatizing/Outsourcing 
 Another possible explanation for current approaches to drug policy 
is the vogue for privatization and outsourcing—taking traditional 
government functions and committing them to private entities.248
Pseudoephedrine purchase restrictions place the burden for reducing 
methamphetamine production on private actors who have incentive 
for compliance. Police officers have less need to spend precious tax-
dollars to root out methamphetamine labs in far-flung rural houses. 
Instead, drugstore personnel check identification, maintain registries 
of purchasers, refuse profit-making purchases as required, and 
shelve pseudoephedrine inaccessibly or in view of surveillance me-
chanisms, all of which represent enforcement costs placed on busi-
ness rather than on taxpayers.249 In general, governments have 
shown a desire to privatize the cost of anti-methamphetamine pro-
grams, in some cases shifting primary responsibility for such pro-
grams to privately financed campaigns250 and in at least one case 
seeking to finance the cost of drug treatment programs through the 
sale of special anti-methamphetamine license plates.251
 The “outsourcing” of drug restrictions to private industry has 
precedent. The first rounds of drug legislation, as described above,252
looked similar to methamphetamine precursor restrictions in that 
they were civil requirements placed on doctors and pharmacists to 
restrict distribution of possibly dangerous drugs. Even after the pri-
mary approach to drug abuse became criminalization and imprison-
ment, private enterprise was considered a possible means for reduc-
ing drug use. During the late 1980s, for example, the Reagan admin-
istration encouraged private employers to drug test employees in an 
effort to fight the “War on Drugs.”253 Placing such efforts at the center 
                                                                                                                               
 248. On the trend toward privatization of government functions, see, e.g., Abraham 
Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 576 (2009) (“The much-noted current trend in 
public administration is toward privatization of public functions.”); Jody Freeman, Extend-
ing Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1291-92 (2003) (not-
ing the trend towards privatization in recent decades). 
 249. See Part III.B(1) supra.
 250. See, e.g., supra note 178 (discussing one such organization, the Montana Meth Project). 
 251. Minnesota Roundup, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Dec. 17, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 20363759. 
 252. See Supra Part II.A(2). 
 253. See Larry Martz et al., Trying to Say ‘No,’ NEWSWEEK, Aug. 11, 1986, at 14 (noting 
that  then-president Ronald Reagan’s proposals for discouraging drug use included 
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of new drug policy is, however, something we have not seen during 
the last several rounds of drug panic. Perhaps what we are seeing is, 
at least in part, an effort on the part of legislators to find ways to re-
duce the harms of illicit drugs while placing the responsibility for en-
forcing new laws primarily upon private parties.
B.   An Age of Ambivalence
 Though many of these theories provide compelling partial expla-
nations for the response to methamphetamine, even stitched together 
they fail to provide a complete explanation. While methamphetamine 
users may have benefited from the perception that theirs was a 
“white drug,” the prevalence of news stories about Native-American 
meth users and Mexican meth merchants have offered levers if the 
culture was intent on racializing the drug;254 moreover, poor rural 
whites are not exactly the kind of powerful group that can be confi-
dent in its immunity from social scapegoating. Similarly, while media 
portrayals of methamphetamine users have certainly been more em-
pathetic than portraits of crack cocaine users,255 they have not shied 
away from blaming meth users for a myriad of social problems, often 
portraying those problems in the most hyperbolic terms.256 While leg-
islatures may have been distracted by our cultural panic against sex-
ually violent offenders,257 history is full of eras in which drug and sex 
panics coexisted or even mutually reinforced each other.258 Finally, 
while the increasing popularity of arguments focusing on individual 
responsibility and the benefits of privatization may well have played 
some role in convincing legislators and voters to approve some par-
ticular pieces of anti-methamphetamine legislation,259 there is no evi-
dence that the content of the legislation was shaped by these—or any 
other—big ideas. 
 What the legislative responses (and nonresponses) to methamphe-
tamine cataloged in this Article reveal more than anything is an un-
dercurrent of ambivalence about current drug policy. In an under-
theorized, semi-rational way, legislators and citizens responding to 
methamphetamine were simply less persuaded by the drumbeat of 
panic than they were in other recent episodes. While they spoke loud-
                                                                                                                               
requiring certain federal workers to be drug tested, offering federal contractors incentives 
to drug test, and generally encouraging private businesses to drug test employees).   
 254. See sources cited supra notes 211 & 217. 
 255. See supra note 213 and sources cited therein. 
 256. See supra note 219-230 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra Part V.A(3). 
 258. For example, the recent crack cocaine panic overlapped with the beginning of the 
modern sex crimes panic. See also supra Part II.A(2) (explaining how cocaine panic of the 
1930s was fueled, in part, by fears of African-American men raping white women). 
 259. See supra Part V.A(4). 
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ly and acted swiftly against methamphetamine, their response was 
more muted and, on the whole, less punitive. 
 A string of developments since 2005 support this diagnosis of ambi-
valence. In recent years, both state legislatures and the United States 
Sentencing Commission have taken steps to lower crack cocaine sen-
tences in response to longstanding racial equity concerns,260 the Su-
preme Court has granted trial judges freedom to reject hefty crack co-
caine sentences on policy grounds,261 and Congress has moved ever 
closer to abolishing the crack/powder sentencing disparities altogeth-
er.262 Meanwhile, in a move both symbolic and substantive, New York 
has drastically reworked its infamously draconian Rockefeller Drug 
Laws,263 while other states have taken similar steps to scale back on 
mandatory minimum sentences.264 Voters in nine states in eleven 
years have voted to approve initiatives and referenda decriminalizing 
medical marijuana.265 Through this all, drug courts and other forms of 
alternative sanctions have quietly established a foothold in nearly 
every jurisdiction.266 Finally, in early 2009, the White House an-
nounced that the federal government would no longer utilize the term 
                                                                                                                               
 260. For the federal developments, see Cassidy, supra note 10, at 125 & n.176 (detail-
ing Commission amendments and Congressional inaction that allowed amendments to 
pass into law). For one representative state development, see supra note 216 (detailing 
change in South Carolina law). 
 261. See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (allowing judges discretion to 
sentence individuals convicted of crack cocaine crimes to lesser terms based on judges’ per-
sonal disapproval of crack/powder disparity). 
 262. For informed speculation that the disparities may finally be repealed this year, 
see Emery, supra note 15. For a list of recent or pending bills proposing to reduce the dis-
parity or eliminate it entirely, see Cassidy, supra note 10, at 133 n.231. Interestingly, all 
the legislation now being considered either lowers crack sentences to the levels that cur-
rently apply to powder cocaine, lowers crack sentences part of the way towards current 
powder cocaine sentences, or sets new sentences for both crack and powder cocaine that are 
less severe than the current crack sentences. The direction of sentencing reform also re-
flects changing times. Cf. Marc Mauer, Race, Drug Laws, & Criminal Justice, 10 TEMP.
POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 325 (2001) (noting that, at that time, efforts to equalize 
powder cocaine and crack cocaine sentences were taking the form of legislation that “basi-
cally says, ‘You want to equalize penalties, we can do that. We will increase the penalties 
for powder cocaine and put even more people in prison’ ”).   
 263. For some of the first such changes, see Ehlers, supra note 132, at 58.  For the 
more recent and drastic changes, see Jeremy W. Peters, Albany Reaches Deal to Repeal ‘70s 
Drug Laws, N.Y. TIMES., Mar. 26, 2009, at A1. 
 264. In New Jersey, for example, the State Assembly recently adopted a bill to elimi-
nate the State’s strict mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes committed in school 
zones (though the State Senate has thus far declined to act). See N.J. Assem. B. 2762, 
213th Legislature, introduced May 19, 2008 (permitting judges to place a defendant on 
probation or to waive the minimum term of parole eligibility after consideration of the de-
fendant’s prior record, the specific location of the drug offense, whether or not school was in 
session at the time of the offense, and whether or not children were present in the area of 
the offense).  
 265. See Brown, supra note 1, at 243-44 (reporting this fact, though noting that this 
trend towards decriminalization of medical marijuana may be constrained by Gonzales v. 
Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)).
 266. See generally Miller, supra note 169. 
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“War on Drugs,” retiring a divisive and militaristic locution that has 
been a flashpoint in the cultural struggle over drug policy.267
 If our instincts about drug regulation are now more ambivalent 
and our policies more balanced, perhaps we have learned something 
from prior panics. With regard to methamphetamine in particular, 
study, scholarship, and activism surrounding the response to crack 
cocaine may have paid dividends in calming the waters during the 
early days of the meth panic. For example, when the predictable 
“meth baby” headlines surfaced during 2005, warning of an epidemic 
of new methamphetamine-addicted and damaged infants,268 public 
health advocates were ready with a signed statement by ninety-two 
medical researchers and drug policy advocates arguing that “use of 
stigmatizing terms, such as ‘ice babies’ and ‘meth babies,’ lack scien-
tific validity and should not be used” noting that “[e]xperience with 
similar labels applied to children exposed parentally to cocaine” had 
impaired efforts to develop policies and treatments appropriate for 
cocaine-exposed children.269 Similarly, when major news sources like 
Newsweek and The Oregonian offered sensationalized account of an 
emerging methademic, investigative journalists and media critics 
were quick to question their unverifiable factual claims and inten-
tionally inflammatory language.270 It is now increasingly common for 
politicians to convene hearings or summits to evaluate, in a syste-
matic way, the efficacy of the heavily punitive antidrug measures on 
which we have been relying.271
 To take a less sanguine view, perhaps it is money that is driving 
our newfound ambivalence. In 1986, then-Democratic congressional 
campaign chair Tony Coehlo said that Congressional representatives 
“intend to bust the budget” on the War on Drugs, which he meant as 
a positive sign of commitment to eradicating drug abuse.272 In con-
                                                                                                                               
 267. See Fields, supra note 15. 
 268. See, e.g., Christine Lagorio, Generation of Meth Babies: Heartland Doctors and 
Programs Help Meth-Addict Moms Cope, CBS NEWS, Apr. 28, 2005, http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/04/28/eveningnews/main691764.shtml; Bennett & Wil-
liams, supra note 213 (quoting a doctor describing babies born to methamphetamine using 
mothers as “worse than crack babies”). 
 269. Letter from Donald G. Miller to Whom It May Concern (July 27, 2005), General 
Media Letter on “Meth Babies” and “Ice Babies,” available at http://www.jointogether.org/ 
resources/pdf/Meth_Letter.pdf. 
 270. See, e.g., Shafer, Meth-Mouth Myth, in SLATE, supra note 107; Shafer, in SLATE,
Meth Madness, supra note 110; Valdez, supra note 231. 
 271. See, e.g., David Lerman, Webb Urges Fresh Look at the War on Drugs, DAILY 
PRESS , June 20, 2008, at A2 (describing hearing by Joint Economic Committee convened 
by Senator Jim Webb to hear testimony from scholars and prosecutors who argue that in-
carceration has been costly and ineffective as a remedy for drug addiction); Diana Heil, 
Meth Use Claims 56 Lives, THE SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Oct. 28, 2005, at C-1 (describing 
drug summit convened by State Drug Czar that recommended primarily treatment, pre-
vention, and environmental remediation efforts).
 272. Martz et al., supra note 253, at 14. According to Congressional representatives at 
the time, money would be no object in fighting the war on drugs. Id.
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trast, budgetary and space constraints make increased incarceration 
less appealing in the 2000s.273 For more than a decade, advocates and 
scholars have been pointing to the budget-breaking cost of mass in-
carceration policies.274 The serious economic crisis that has engulfed 
this nation in the last two years may have forced states to take no-
tice. Certainly, it is impossible to open a newspaper without reading 
a story about the devastating state of particular state budgets.275 In 
almost every instance, coverage of state budge woes discusses either 
the role that prison costs have played in driving up state expendi-
tures or proposed cuts to prison budgets or both.276 In a time of belt-
tightening and tough choices, spending tens of thousands of dollars a 
year to express your moral indignity towards a particular individual 
might, to some, come to seem an emotional extravagance.   
VI.   CONCLUSION
 What if they threw a drug panic and nobody came?   
 While the media, public, and legislatures clearly have identified 
methamphetamine use and production as a serious issue worthy of at-
tention and concern, and while hyperbolic anecdotes and natural-
disaster analogies have worked their way into discourse, they have not 
leveraged a concomitantly hyperbolic criminal sanctions response. 
 While we have seen criminal sanctions expand and increase 
somewhat in response to methamphetamine, and we have in particu-
lar seen movement to protect children and to authorize police to 
search with less preclearance and restriction,277 the legislative re-
sponse has focused on prevention, via restrictions on precursor pur-
chases and education of potential users.278 The focus of legislative 
change has been primarily on making it difficult for people to produce 
methamphetamine and protecting “innocents” from either trying the 
drug or being exposed to substances that are volatile and toxic. 
 Certainly, the racial differences between methamphetamine us-
ers/producers and public perceptions of, for example, crack cocaine 
users/sellers can work to explain the differences between the choice 
                                                                                                                               
 273.  See, e.g., Schone, supra note 129, at 32-33 (noting that Missouri’s state budget is 
strained, prison beds are filled, and the state lacks both funds and cells to incarcerate 
methamphetamine users and producers).   
 274. See, e.g., id.
 275. See, e.g., Solomon Moore, California State Assembly Approves Prison Legislation, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A19 (reporting on legislation dealing with California budget crisis). 
 276. See, e.g. id. (reporting that the California Assembly passed a bill that will cut the 
state prison population by about 27,000 inmates, saving about one billion dollars per year). 
Underscoring that this is an age of ambivalence about drug policy, not an age of retreat, 
the article points out that the State Senate passed an even bolder bill but that, after exten-
sive lobbying, the Assembly balked at the broader cuts. See id.
 277. See generally supra Part IV. 
 278. See generally supra Part III.  
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to primarily control methamphetamine through limiting pseudoe-
phedrine purchases and the choice to control crack cocaine through 
lengthy and mandatory prison terms.279 As methamphetamine supply 
shifts to importation rather than mom-and-pop production, and as 
that importation is linked to Hispanic importers and illegal immigra-
tion, we may see the extent to which race and ethnicity drive legisla-
tive action; under the social group theory,280 we will expect to see me-
thamphetamine sanctions rise dramatically, and time will tell 
whether or not the prevention-education-personal regulation model is 
transitory or trend. 
 In the meantime, the United States appears to have entered a pe-
riod in which the appetite for increased drug-related penalties has 
waned.281 In part, this may be because of increased panic about vio-
lent crime, particularly sex offenses against children; it may stem 
from norm shifts that encourage “personal responsibility” and priva-
tization; or it may reflect, related to all of these theories, tight gov-
ernment budgets and a governmental desire to craft programs that 
cost little and place the onus on private parties to resolve social prob-
lems. In general, legislators and citizens seem more ambivalent 
about the ability of incarceration to address the problems associated 
with substance use and abuse, and willing to examine strategies that 
place less emphasis on costly prison programs and more emphasis on 
private industry and individual will. 
 Is this a positive shift? The efficacy of methamphetamine res-
ponses remains to be seen. The general shift in focus from criminal 
punishment to education, alternatives to incarceration, and precursor 
control may be good news for foes of mass incarceration, and might 
represent a rational, evidence-based approach to a substance that in-
arguably has ill effects. Or perhaps it simply represents a damning of 
expectations, some measure of fiscal austerity and economic reality 
as applied to government policy. Either way, I argue that what the 
response to methamphetamine has shown us is that we have entered 
an age of ambivalence—one where we are less certain that harsh 
criminal sanctions are the solution to social problems, and one where 
we are open to alternatives. 
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 281. See supra Part V.B. 
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